




What We Want.

Requirements of Renewable Energy Investors in Emerging Markets.



iidevelopment presentation for GIZ

Tunis – November 2013

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What We Want.

Requirements of Renewable Energy Investors in Emerging Markets.

1. Which types of investors are present in RE?
2. What do these investors want?
3. What can governments do to attract, keep and steer these investors? Examples for typical effects of policy on risk and yield expectations.



1. Which **types of investors** are present in Renewable Energy (RE)?

Institutional investors

i.e. Insurances, pension funds, savings unions, development banks, impact investors

These three types have differing motives and requirements!

Commercial investors

i.e. venture capital, special funds, structured bonds, electric utilities, independent power producers, ESCOs

Thus, always 3, instead of 2, indicators:

1. Risk
2. Yield
3. Other criteria

Private Investors

i.e. SME, farmers, homeowners, cooperatives




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1. Which **types of investors** are present in Renewable Energy (RE)?

Explanation of risk and yield:

- RE are „**Front Loaded**“, unlike conventional powerplants
- This is why risk ($\Delta t > 10a$) is so important for yield expectations (want high ROI = DCF)
- Commercial investors in meerging markets aim to break even after 3-8 years due to high volatilities
- Much less than the 15 years typical for RE feed-in programmes in EU
- PPA >5 years credible?





2. What do these three investor types want?

Institutional investors

- Important: **risk** & SPV-Volatility
- Grants until around 2020ca 2020 for EZ-goals= **Other Criteria**

Commercial investors

- Maximise **F(risk, yield)**
- Other criteria less relevant
- Country risk not applicable to local SMB

Private Investors

- Extremely amorphous group and very subjective assessments: self-sustainability, do-gooders, soldiers of fortune, ...
- Risk is underrated (no portfolio). Thus **Yield + Other Criteria** = liquidity, timing and nimbus



3. What can **governments** do? Examples.

3.1. Risk determines expected yields

Profit expected by Investors (3) depends on (1) country risk and (2) PV-specific Risk					
	Germany 2011 (BASE CASE)*	Germany 2001	Brasil 2011**	Italy 2011	remarks
1. 10a Gov Bond	1.5%	4.5%	11%	6%	* Note that Risk Premium in D went UP in 2013 due to decreasing EEG predictability (NB this is separate from lower yield from lower FIT). **Note that Gov bonds went down in BRA from 2011 to 2013
2. PV Risk Premium	2.5%	5.0%	7%	7%	
3. Required ROI min	4.0%	9.5%	18%	13%	



Country risk → Energy ministers can hardly influence it



where other sources are named



Subsector risk → A number of ministries can directly influence this: regulation can lower risk!

Global ranks of our 3 country cases for different indicators

Country Indicator	Brazil	Italy	Germany	source	*PV SPV importance
Starting a Business	121	84	106	World Bank	3
Dealing with Construction Permits	131	103	14	World Bank	5
Getting Electricity	60	107	2	World Bank	5
Registering Property	109	39	81	World Bank	3
Getting Credit	104	104	23	World Bank	2
Protecting Investors	82	49	100	World Bank	5
Paying Taxes	156	131	72	World Bank	2
Trading Across Borders	123	55	13	World Bank	1
Enforcing Contracts	116	160	5	World Bank	4
Resolving Insolvency	143	31	19	World Bank	0
Corruption Perceptions	69	72	13	Transparency	4
WBG average rank of country	110	86	44	<i>indicators 1-10 (wbg)</i>	
Our weighted "PV SPV rank"	101	92	42	<i>indicators 1-11 weighted with *</i>	

128% WBG ratio Bra/Ita
110% PVSPV ratio Bra/Ita



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Subsector risk → A number of ministries can directly influence this: regulation can lower risk!

Brazil		Italy		Germany	
procedure step	duration	procedure step	duration	procedure step	duration
1	Request and obtain proof of land ownership from Real Estate Registry Office	1	Obtain notice from the Regional Technical Office (Servizio Celler)	1	Obtain building permit
2	Request and obtain proof of land tax payment from Treasury of the Municipality	2	Obtain building permit	2	Application for approval of static calculations
3	Register compliance with the Social Security Office	3	Hire an independent engineer to test structure	3	Receive inspection from State's Chimney Sweeper
4	Submit proof of payment to Social Security	4	Hire Certified Notification of Building Activity (Dichiarazione)	4	Receive inspection of the building shell
5	Request and obtain Construction Approval Permit and Construction Duration Permit	5	Register the building	5	Receive inspection after completion of the building ("Inspezione finale")
6	Request and obtain Equipment Operating Permit	6	Obtain occupancy certificate	6	Apply for water connection
7	Request and receive frame inspection from Municipality	7	Receive on-site inspection by the Fire Department	7	Receive inspection by water company
8	Request and receive inspection of the structure from Municipality	8	Apply for water and sewerage connection	8	Obtain water connection
9	Request and receive labor inspection from Labor Public Administration Office	9	Receive on-site inspection and estimation of water and sewerage installation costs	9	Obtain telephone line
10	Request and receive sanitary inspection from Municipality	10	Obtain water and sewerage installation	10	
11	Request and obtain conclusion approval	11	Obtain telephone connection	11	
12	Receive final inspection from Municipality	12		12	
13	Request and receive Fire Department inspection	13		13	
14	Request and obtain operating license	14		14	
15	Request and connect to water and sewerage	15		15	
16	Request and connect to telephone	16		16	
17	Register with the Real Estate Registry Office	17		17	
Total Days (average)		488	236	97	
average months		13	6	3	
average years		1.1	0.6	0.3	



Project risk → Investors themselves can have an influence. For example EPC-Risk

EPC	P: probability that the firm is alive in 2-2014 [% of 100]						P (alive 2014)	rank	N	2σ	EPC	our overall rating
	1	2	3	4	5	6						
A	50	65	70	90	75	95	74%	2	6	15%	A	Top
B	80	90		90	90	90	88%	1	5	4%	B	Top
C		40		50	60	70	55%	5	4	11%	C	Risky
D		25				65	45%	8	2	20%	D	No Go
E	80					60	70%	4	2	10%	E	Risky
F		75	40	60	50	40	53%	6	5	13%	F	Risky
G	50	7	30	40	50	40	36%	9	6	15%	G	No Go
H	30	60	80	50	30	55	51%	7	6	17%	H	Risky
I	65	100	60	90	50	80	74%	2	6	17%	I	Top
J							10%	0			J	No Go



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3. What can governments do? Examples.

3.2. The LCOE lies




Figure 6: Residential PV price parity (size of bubbles refers to market size) (BNEF, 2012a).
 Note: LCOE based on 6% weighted average cost of capital, 0.7%/year module degradation, 1% capex as O&M annually, \$3.0/W capex assumed for 2012, \$2.00/W for 2015.



Source of graph & caption: Bazilian et al 2012



3. What can governments do? Examples.

3.2. The LCOE lies

	Germany		LAC			LAC private 2015	LAC private 2016	LAC private 2017
	D end 2012	D 2013 too low	LAC private 2013/4	LAC public 2013/4				
yield	1000	1000	2000	2000		2000	2000	2000
FIT \$/kWh	\$ 0.20	\$ 0.15	\$ 0.15	\$ 0.10		\$ 0.14	\$ 0.12	\$ 0.11
yield*FIT p.a.	200,000	150,000	300,000	200,000	90%	\$ 270,000	\$ 243,000	\$ 218,700
O&M	1.5%	1.5%	1.5%	1.5%		1.5%	1.5%	1.5%
	\$ (30,000)	\$ (30,000)	\$ (30,000)	\$ (30,000)		\$ (27,000)	\$ (24,300)	\$ (21,870)
TIR Proj	6%	2%	12%	6%		12%	12%	12%
EPC	\$ (2,000,000)	\$ (2,000,000)	\$ (2,000,000)	\$ (2,000,000)	90%	\$ (1,800,000)	\$ (1,620,000)	\$ (1,458,000)

	EK	FK	TIR
	1		9
D 2013 lowest "marginal Insti"	3.5%	4.0%	4.0%
	2		8
D 2012	10.0%	5.0%	6.0%
	4		6
LAC 2013 - low PV Risk	15.0%	10.0%	12.0%
	5		5
LAC 2013 - High PV Risk	25%	15%	20.0%






3. What can governments do? Examples.

3.3. Promotion of renewables influences investor types




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3.3. Promotion of renewables influences investor types





3. What can governments do? Examples.
 3.4. Transparency minimizes risk! In the long-term, prices adjust to the economic optimum.



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 3.4. Transparency minimizes risk! In the long-term, prices adjust to the economic optimum.


Problem:

- Estimates of RE benefits in literature are extremely inaccurate. Little empirical work [RMI2013]
- Wrong methods and secondary effects
- **Results = 4-40 US cents/kWh Error>100%!**
- Wait for “smart grid” und batteries

GIZ sector projects:

- **Operational Benefits: OpBen** at Optimal Dispatch
- Straightforward: Avoided fuel costs in actual generation parks
- Variation of up to 50% RE penetration without net loss of stability!!
- **Results: OpBen = 10-15 US cents/kWh ± 10%**
- Total benefits 2013 = 15-25 cents/kWh ± 30%
- F (country, RE penetration rate, price of gas)

Estimates of RE benefits are extremely inaccurate.





3. What can governments do? Examples.


3.4. Transparency minimizes risk! In the long-term, prices adjust to the economic optimum.

Results:

- Benefits higher than estimates in literature
- High penetration rates are possible without necessarily hindering benefits
- Benefits may rise with higher penetration rates
- Spinning reserve plays much smaller role than expected



	OpBen [\$/MWh]
ARGENTINA	102
BOLIVIA	111
ECUADOR	132
EL SALVADOR	145



What We Want.

Which requirements do investors have for Renewable Energy in Emerging Markets?

Thank you for listening!

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