Difference between revisions of "National Approaches to Electrification – Legal Basis"
***** (***** | *****) m |
***** (***** | *****) m |
||
Line 24: | Line 24: | ||
'''<span></span><span></span><span>An exclusive right (monopoly) granted by government to sell electricity or standalone systems</span><span></span><span></span>''' | '''<span></span><span></span><span>An exclusive right (monopoly) granted by government to sell electricity or standalone systems</span><span></span><span></span>''' | ||
− | <span>A concession may:< | + | <span>A concession may:</span><br/> |
*Cover the entire country or a specific area<br/> | *Cover the entire country or a specific area<br/> | ||
Line 111: | Line 111: | ||
| style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(191, 144, 0);" | <br/> | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(191, 144, 0);" | <br/> | ||
| | | | ||
+ | *EUEI PDF (2014), Mini-grid Policy Toolkit: Policy and Business Frameworks for Successful Mini-grid Roll-outs <u>[http://www.euei-pdf.org/sites/default/files/field_publication_file/RECP_mini-grid_Policy_Toolkit_1pageview_(pdf,_17.6MB,_EN_0.pdf http://www.euei-pdf.org/sites/default/files/field_publication_file/RECP_mini-grid_Policy_Toolkit_1pageview_(pdf,_17.6MB,_EN_0.pdf]</u> | ||
+ | *<u></u>IRENA (2016), Policies and regulations to support renewable energy mini-grid development through private sector involvement <u><u>[http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_Policies_Regulations_minigrids_2016.pdf http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_Policies_Regulations_mini-grids_2016.pdf]</u></u> | ||
+ | *Senegal. Agence Senegalaise d’Electrification Rurale (2009), Concession d’Electrification Rurale au Senegal, The Africa Electrification Initiative (AEI) Workshop, Maputo, Mozambique 9-12 Juin 2009. <u><u>[http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAFRREGTOPENERGY/Resources/717305-1264695610003/6743444-1268073657582/15.4.Senegal.pdf http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAFRREGTOPENERGY/Resources/717305-1264695610003/6743444-1268073657582/15.4.Senegal.pdf]</u></u><br/> | ||
+ | *World Bank, (2000), Regulatory Approaches to Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy: Case Studies from Six Developing Countries <u style="font-size: 13.6px;">[http://www.martinot.info/Martinot_Reiche_WB.pdf http://www.martinot.info/Martinot_Reiche_WB.pdf]</u> | ||
+ | * | ||
+ | Senegal. OBA (2007), OBA in Senegal – Designing Technology-Neutral Concessions for Rural Electrification <u>[https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/11034/396090SN0OBApp1140Electric01PUBLIC1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/11034/396090SN0OBApp1140Electric01PUBLIC1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y]</u> | ||
+ | |||
|} | |} | ||
Line 121: | Line 128: | ||
| style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(191, 144, 0);" | <br/> | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(191, 144, 0);" | <br/> | ||
| | | | ||
+ | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Bangladesh,_IDCOL_Solar_Home_Systems|Bangladesh, IDCOL Solar Home Systems]]<br/> | ||
*[[NAE Case Study: Brazil, Luz para Todos (Light for All)|Brazil, Luz para Todos (Light for All)]]<br/> | *[[NAE Case Study: Brazil, Luz para Todos (Light for All)|Brazil, Luz para Todos (Light for All)]]<br/> | ||
+ | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Costa_Rica,_Distribution_Cooperatives|Costa Rica, Distribution Cooperatives]]<br/> | ||
+ | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Mali,_Rural_Electrification_Programme|Mali, Rural Electrification Programme]]<br/> | ||
+ | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Peru,_Concession_Model_for_Standalone_Systems|Peru, Concession Model for Standalone Systems]]<br/> | ||
+ | *[[NAE_Case_Study:_Philippines,_Islanded_Distribution_by_Cooperatives|Philippines, Islanded Distribution by Cooperatives]]<br/> | ||
*[[NAE Case Study: South Africa, Integrated National Electrification|South Africa, Integrated National Electrification]]<br/> | *[[NAE Case Study: South Africa, Integrated National Electrification|South Africa, Integrated National Electrification]]<br/> | ||
*[[NAE Case Study: Tunisia, Low Cost Distribution Technology|Tunisia, Low Cost Distribution Technology]]<br/> | *[[NAE Case Study: Tunisia, Low Cost Distribution Technology|Tunisia, Low Cost Distribution Technology]]<br/> |
Revision as of 13:12, 25 June 2018
![]() |
Legal Basis: The basis on which organisations are legally entitled to sell electricity
Concession
Definition: |
An exclusive right (monopoly) granted by government to sell electricity or standalone systems A concession may:
Concessions are usually granted to attract private investment by guaranteeing the investor protection from competition, or to protect public investment. |
Internactions wiht other NAE Categories:
Technologies
|
Grid systems and larger grid-connected mini-grids / distribution systems and isolated mini-grids almost always require concessions (because of the substantial investment required). As a result, the right to transmit and sell electricity is often reserved to the national grid company and/or mini-grid/distribution system operator (at least within the area they reach). For smaller mini-grids, with lower, shorter-term capital investment, a license (which grants a non-exclusive right to sell electricity) may be seen as more appropriate, and mini-grids below a certain size are often unregulated. A key question for private mini-grid investors will be what happens when the main grid arrives? Grid extension into a mini-grid concession area within the concession period may be prohibited, or there may be explicit provision for compensation and transfer of assets to grid ownership. Grid and mini-grid concessions thus often interrelate (with each preventing or having explicit provision for extending into the other’s area). | |
Delivery Models
|
Public delivery models are frequently combined with what are effectively concessions, though the monopoly may be created by, for instance, reserving the right to sell electricity to a national utility company, and may not therefore be labelled as a concession. Oversight and control may then be through organisational hierarchy rather than any explicit regulatory framework. Concessions are used to attract private participation in private and public-private models and may be the means through which public-private models are established. | |
Price/Tariff Regulation
|
Where a concession is granted prices will almost certainly be regulated both to enable private investors to estimate revenues over the concession period and to protect users and ensure that the concessionaire is not over-exploiting their monopoly position. This regulation may be through the terms of the concession itself, rather than through a wider framework. Prices may be set on either a uniform or an individual basis. | |
Finance
|
A concession is a means of attracting private finance, by offering the investor higher levels of sales (in the absence of competition) and lower risk in predicting those sales. It may also be used to protect public investment in infrastructure such as grid systems, and as a means of channelling public financial support into electricity provision. | |
Non-Financial Interventions
|
National energy planning is key to establishing the optimum mix of technologies to meet electrification needs across the country, regardless of the regulatory model employed. Institutional restructuring (eg of the national utility company) and regulatory reform may be needed to enable concessions to be established and capacity building or technical assistance may be required if the key actors lack the capacity to undertake this regulatory reform or design concession arrangements. Awareness raising and demand promotion amongst users and service providers, as well as training (capacity building) to develop the skilled workforce needed by concessionaires can be beneficial alongside financial forms of public support. |
Advantages and Disadvantages
The key advantage of a concession is that, by removing the potential for others to sell within the concession area, it allows demand to be captured by a single supplier, giving them economies of scale, and makes it easier to forecast volume of sales and so easier for investors to forecast future revenues (whereas license-based price/tariff regulation only reduces price uncertainty). As well as attracting more private finance this may reduce required return on investment and hence finance costs, but it also removes the benefits of competition once the concession has been granted and so places heavier demand on regulation to protect users, though potential providers may be required to compete for the concession through a tender process. Concession approaches can be rigid, and require significant capacity within regulatory authorities to design approaches which attract private finance while avoiding over-exploitation of users. Concessions also, by their nature, create boundaries and so push investors towards project finance and thinking by limiting their ability to expand their business beyond pre-set borders or to continue it beyond the end of a concession period. For capital-intensive infrastructure-based means of electrification (grid and mini-grids), however, a concession may just represent recognition of a natural monopoly and the need for explicit arrangements for arrival of the grid, and it is for these that a concession is most likely to be appropriate. |
Further Informaiton and Guidance
Senegal. OBA (2007), OBA in Senegal – Designing Technology-Neutral Concessions for Rural Electrification https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/11034/396090SN0OBApp1140Electric01PUBLIC1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y |
Relevante Case Studies:
Private Delivery Model
Definition: |
Delivery of electricity access by an entity or entities none of which are owned and managed by the state, using purely private finance. In this model all of the organisations engaged in provision of electricity access (whether through supply of electricity itself or provision of electricity systems), as part of the National Electrification Approach being considered, are non-state-owned. This implies that all the actors along the market chain1 (Project Development, Manufacture/Generation, Distribution and Retail) are non-state entities such as private companies, cooperatives, social enterprises, community organisations or NGOs (all characterised for this purpose as “private” organisations). |
Internactions wiht other NAE Categories:
Technologies
|
Few, if any, national grid systems have been established through a private delivery model (though in many countries privatisation has been used to transfer them into private ownership and bring in private investment). Grid-connected mini-grids and distribution systems have frequently been developed by private (non-state-owned) organisations. Where the grid system is also privately-owned, this constitutes a private model. (However, if the grid system is publically owned, and the mini-grid or distribution system uses electricity from the grid system, or the development draws on public grants, subsidies, loans, tax exemptions or guarantees, it constitutes a public-private partnership). The most frequently used models for delivery of standalone systems are private, though involvement of state-organisations along the market chain, or use of funding from grants or subsidies provided by the state, donors or international agencies, may result in private-public partnerships. | |
Legual Basis
|
A private delivery model calls for an explicit legal framework for any form of electrification which involves significant long-term capital investment (grid, mini-grids and potentially standalone systems which are charged for on a pay-as-you-go basis) in order to attract private finance and allow for price regulation to protect users. A concession, which offers protection from competition, will provide the greatest attraction for private financiers. Where no long-term capital investment is involved, as with standalone systems sold directly to users, it’s generally considered that no legal control (beyond that for any business) is necessary. | |
Price/Tariff Regulation
|
Where electricity is delivered by the private sector, using purely private finance, in a competitive market with no legal or effective monopoly (eg where several solar lanterns providers are operating) price regulation may be regarded as unnecessary. However, where any form of concession has been granted (or exists in practice), price regulation would be expected to protect users. On the other side, where significant capital investment is involved private financiers are likely to require a transparent framework for price/tariff regulation, to reduce the risk of price controls being introduced in the future at below cost-recovery levels and preventing full recovery of and return on investment. | |
Finance
|
As discussed above a private delivery model must be purely privately financed (since inclusion of any public finance would cause the delivery model to be categorized as a public-private partnership). Ultimately private delivery models will rely on connection and ongoing charges, and standalone system purchases from users. For multi-user systems (grids and mini-grids) there is also likely to be some element of cross-subsidy between users. | |
Non-Financial Interventions
|
National energy planning is key to establishing the optimum mix of technologies to meet electrification needs across the country, regardless of the delivery model employed. Institutional restructuring and capacity building or technical assistance may be needed where the key actors lack the capacity to undertake regulatory reform in order to establish the legal and regulatory framework for private electrification, or to set and implement technical and quality standards (needed where the private sector is delivering access through mini-grids or distribution systems to ensure safety and compatibility between systems, and to support user confidence). Awareness raising amongst users and other potential market actors and service providers, as well as training (capacity building) to develop the skilled workforce needed by new energy access businesses are likely to be particularly relevant under a private delivery model, and demand promotion may be needed to increase revenues and make electricity access economically sustainable. Private delivery models are often a means of introducing new technologies, with private sector players bringing in technologies which they believe will have advantages over existing options which will allow them to grow their businesses. (Such new technology introduction, however, brings risks, and the private sector will expect to reap additional returns to balance these risks). |
Advantages and Disadvantages
The private sector is widely seen as being more efficient, innovative flexible and nimble that the public sector and it is these virtues that it brings to energy access provision. Use of a private delivery model can be a way of bringing private sector skills and finance (both national and international), and the benefits of competition into the energy sector. Where public institutions are weak and ineffective, private delivery models may seem attractive, but it must be recognised that successful private delivery relies (particularly for grids and mini-grids) on effective public management including strong regulatory frameworks and this calls for capabilities within public institutions which they may lack. There are also elements needed for the private sector to deliver, such as workforce skills and user awareness, which individual businesses may be reluctant to provide, because of the costs involved and because in a competitive market they will be unsure that they (rather than competitors) will capture the benefits and secure a return on their investment. In addition, where modern energy access is not affordable on a purely private financed basis or public financial input is needed to support the costs of early market development, a public-private partnership delivery model will be needed. Grid-connected mini-grids can, in theory, provide any level of electricity supply, but in most cases if the investment is made for grid connection and associated standards are met, they provide a grid-equivalent service, meeting all household, commercial, industrial and community requirements (Tier 5). (If the grid system itself is over-stretched with inadequate generation; or insufficiently robust or poorly maintained transmission and distribution systems reliability and quality of supply may deteriorate so that while users have a physical connection, they may not in fact have reliable access to electricity (bringing the supply Tier 3 or lower). To the extent that a grid-connected mini-grid draws on electricity from the grid its construction should be coupled with development of additional centralized generation capacity to support the resulting additional demand. |
Further Informaiton and Guidance
Relevante Case Studies:
None of the examples examined have had a purely private sector delivery models (ie no public involvement in either ownership or funding). |
Public-Private Partnership Delivery Model
Definition: |
Delivery of electricity access by an entity which is part publically and part privately owned or by a mix of publically and privately owned entities or using a combination of public and private finance This includes cases where:
|
Internactions wiht other NAE Categories:
Technologies
|
Public-private models for grid systems might include:
For grid connected mini-grids and distribution systems:
For isolated mini-grids:
Use of public finance (grants, subsidies and loans) to enhance affordability and support market growth often results in a public-private model for standalone systems, even when there is a purely private-sector chain of manufacturers, importers, distributors and retailers. There could also be benefits in some circumstances from government energy agencies becoming directly involved in the standalone system market, by forming a joint entity to supply systems or by taking on one of the roles along the value chain (eg providing a distribution service for all system providers), as a means of supporting market development. | |
Legual Basis
|
Because a public-private model involves private ownership and investment, an explicit legal framework will be required for any form of electrification which involves significant long-term capital investment in order to attract private finance and allow for price regulation to protect users. A concession, which offers protection from competition, will provide the greatest attraction for private financiers. Where no long-term capital investment is involved, as with standalone systems sold directly to users, no legal control (beyond that for any business) may be necessary – however if there is partial public sector ownership, a transparent legal framework may be required to convince private market participants that they are not facing unfair competition, and also to ensure that any public finance is not being misused. | |
Price/Tariff Regulation
|
Where significant capital investment is involved, a transparent framework for price/tariff regulation is likely to be required to attract the private element into any public-private partnership. Tariff regulation will also protect users and provide a means of ensuring that public finance is not being misused or exploited by the private sector. It may also demonstrate to private market participants that they are not facing unfair competition from partially publically-owned market participants. | |
Finance
|
All public-private partnerships will involve a combination of private and public finance. Private finance will come through ownership and investment in, and loans to electricity providers. Public finance may come through these routes, but may also be through various forms of grant, subsidy, tax exemption or guarantee. Ultimately public-private models, like other forms of electricity provision, will rely on connection and ongoing charges, and standalone system purchases from users. For multi-user systems (grids and mini-grids) there is also likely to be some element of cross-subsidy between users. | |
Non-Financial Interventions
|
National energy planning is key to establishing the optimum mix of technologies to meet electrification needs across the country, regardless of the delivery model employed. Institutional restructuring may be needed to establish public-private partnerships and capacity building or technical assistance may be required if the key actors lack the capacity to undertake regulatory reform or design arrangements for public financial support. Awareness raising amongst users and other potential market actors and service providers, as well as training (capacity building) to develop the skilled workforce needed by new energy access businesses can be beneficial alongside financial forms of public support. Public-private partnership may also provide the means to bring in new technology, with the private sector providing the technology know-how while the public sector bears the risk inherent in new technology which private investors may be reluctant to take on. |
Advantages and Disadvantages (Including Level of Electricity Provided)
Public-Private partnerships offer the potential to combine the benefits of both models, with public security being combined with private efficiency, innovation and flexibility. Bringing in private finance can extend the capacity for electricity provision beyond that which the public sector alone can offer, while public financial support can be used to attract private finance and make electricity affordable for users. Combining public and private inputs is not, however, simple. Significant expertise is required to ensure that private investment is attracted while making optimum use of public resources. Moreover the appropriate form of public-private partnership will change as markets develop and levels of electricity access increase – and this must be recognised while at the same time creating regimes which can give the private sector the confidence in the future they require to invest. |
Further Informaiton and Guidance
|
Relevante Case Studies:
References
Authors
Authors: Mary Willcox, Dean Cooper
Acknowledgements
The Review was prepared by Mary Willcox and Dean Cooper of Practical Action Consulting working with Hadley Taylor, Silvia Cabriolu-Poddu and Christina Stuart of the EU Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEIPDF) and Michael Koeberlein and Caspar Priesemann of the Energising Development Programme (EnDev). It is based on a literature review, stakeholder consultations. The categorization framework in the review tool is based on the EUEI/PDF / Practical Action publication "Building Energy Access Markets - A Value Chain Analysis of Key Energy Market Systems".
A wider range of stakeholders were consulted during its preparation and we would particularly like to thank the following for their valuable contributions and insights: - Jeff Felten, AfDB - Marcus Wiemann and other members, ARE - Guilherme Collares Pereira, EdP - David Otieno Ochieng, EUEI-PDF - Silvia Luisa Escudero Santos Ascarza, EUEI-PDF - Nico Peterschmidt, Inensus - John Tkacik, REEEP - Khorommbi Bongwe, South Africa: Department of Energy - Rashid Ali Abdallah, African Union Commission - Nicola Bugatti, ECREEE - Getahun Moges Kifle, Ethiopian Energy Authority - Mario Merchan Andres, EUEI-PDF - Tatjana Walter-Breidenstein, EUEI-PDF - Rebecca Symington, Mlinda Foundation - Marcel Raats, RVO.NL - Nico Tyabji, Sunfunder -
Any feedback would be very welcome. If you have any comments or enquires please contact: mary.willcox@practicalaction.org.uk, benjamin.attigah@euei-pdf.org, or caspar.priesemann@giz.de.
Download the Tool as a Power Point: https://energypedia.info/images/a/aa/National_Approaches_to_Electrification_-_Review_of_Options.pptx