Difference between revisions of "National Approaches to Electrification – Legal Basis"
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[[File:Back to NAE Overview Page.png|center|800px|NAE Overview Page|alt=NAE Overview Page|link=National Approaches to Electrification – Review of Options]] | [[File:Back to NAE Overview Page.png|center|800px|NAE Overview Page|alt=NAE Overview Page|link=National Approaches to Electrification – Review of Options]] | ||
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− | <p style="text-align: center | + | <p style="text-align: center"><span style="color:#986500ff">'''Legal Basis: The basis on which organisations are legally entitled to sell electricity'''</span></p> |
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= Concession<br/> = | = Concession<br/> = | ||
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− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF"><span style="font-size: 13.6px">Definition</span></span><br/> |
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'''<span></span><span></span><span>An exclusive right (monopoly) granted by government to sell electricity or standalone systems</span><span></span><span></span>''' | '''<span></span><span></span><span>An exclusive right (monopoly) granted by government to sell electricity or standalone systems</span><span></span><span></span>''' | ||
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− | == | + | == Interactions with other NAE Categories == |
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− | <font color="#ffffff"> | + | <font color="#ffffff">Technology</font> |
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− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF"></span>[[Portal:Grid|Grid]] systems and larger grid-connected [[Portal:Mini-grid|mini-grids]] / distribution systems and isolated mini-grids almost always require concessions (because of the substantial investment required). As a result, the right to transmit and sell electricity is often reserved to the national grid company and/or mini-grid/distribution system operator (at least within the area they reach). For smaller mini-grids, with lower, shorter-term capital investment, a license (which grants a non-exclusive right to sell electricity) may be seen as more appropriate, and mini-grids below a certain size are often unregulated. A key question for private mini-grid investors will be what happens when the main grid arrives? Grid extension into a mini-grid concession area within the concession period may be prohibited, or there may be explicit provision for compensation and transfer of assets to grid ownership. Grid and mini-grid concessions thus often interrelate (with each preventing or having explicit provision for extending into the other’s area).<br/><br/>Concessions are more rarely used for standalone systems. This reflects policy-makers’ perception of them as product retailers rather than infrastructure providers, but also that without long-term fixed capital investment private companies have not needed the protection of a concession to attract private capital (and would regard it as a regulatory burden). Concessions may however be used to bring standalone system companies into a market which they might otherwise be unwilling to enter. It’s also possible where pay-as-you-go arrangements are used, where the provider retains ownership of the system until the user has bought it through monthly payments, or even<br/>over its full life with the user paying for electricity used, a concession arrangement may be appropriate. Where grid or mini-grid concessions are set up, these rarely forbid sale of standalone systems by others, and vice versa, though standalone systems may be included as one means of providing electricity within an integrated electricity concession encompassing mini-grid<br/>and/or grid access.<br/> |
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− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF"></span><span style="color:#FFFFFF">Delivery Model</span><br/> |
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Public delivery models are frequently combined with what are effectively concessions, though the monopoly may be created by, for instance, reserving the right to sell electricity to a national utility company, and may not therefore be labelled as a concession. Oversight and control may then be through organisational hierarchy rather than any explicit regulatory framework. Concessions are used to attract private participation in private and public-private models and may be the means through which public-private models are established. | Public delivery models are frequently combined with what are effectively concessions, though the monopoly may be created by, for instance, reserving the right to sell electricity to a national utility company, and may not therefore be labelled as a concession. Oversight and control may then be through organisational hierarchy rather than any explicit regulatory framework. Concessions are used to attract private participation in private and public-private models and may be the means through which public-private models are established. | ||
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− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF"></span><span style="color:#FFFFFF">Price/Tariff Regulation</span><span style="color:#FFFFFF"></span><br/> |
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<span>Where a concession is granted prices will almost certainly be regulated both to enable private investors to estimate revenues over the concession period and to protect users and ensure that the concessionaire is not over-exploiting their monopoly position. This regulation may be through the terms of the concession itself, rather than through a wider framework. Prices may be set on either a uniform or an individual basis.</span><span></span> | <span>Where a concession is granted prices will almost certainly be regulated both to enable private investors to estimate revenues over the concession period and to protect users and ensure that the concessionaire is not over-exploiting their monopoly position. This regulation may be through the terms of the concession itself, rather than through a wider framework. Prices may be set on either a uniform or an individual basis.</span><span></span> | ||
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− | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(32, 56, 100) | + | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(32, 56, 100)" | |
− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF">Finance</span><span style="color:#FFFFFF"></span><br/> |
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− | <span>A concession is a means of attracting private finance, by offering the investor higher levels of sales (in the absence of competition) and lower risk in predicting those sales. It may also be used to protect public investment in infrastructure such as grid systems, and as a means of channelling public financial support into electricity provision.</span><span></span> | + | <span>A concession is a means of attracting private [[Portal:Financing and Funding|finance]], by offering the investor higher levels of sales (in the absence of competition) and lower risk in predicting those sales. It may also be used to protect public investment in infrastructure such as grid systems, and as a means of channelling public financial support into electricity provision.</span><span></span> |
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− | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(0, 100, 100) | + | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(0, 100, 100)" | |
− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF"></span><span style="color:#FFFFFF">Non-Financial Interventions</span><span style="color:#FFFFFF"></span><br/> |
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− | National energy planning is key to establishing the optimum mix of technologies to meet electrification needs across the country, regardless of the regulatory model employed. Institutional restructuring (eg of the national utility company) and regulatory reform may be needed to enable concessions to be established and capacity building or technical assistance may be required if the key actors lack the capacity to undertake this regulatory reform or design concession arrangements. <span style="font-size: 13.6px | + | National energy planning is key to establishing the optimum mix of technologies to meet electrification needs across the country, regardless of the regulatory model employed. Institutional restructuring (eg of the national utility company) and regulatory reform may be needed to enable concessions to be established and capacity building or technical assistance may be required if the key actors lack the capacity to undertake this regulatory reform or design concession arrangements. <span style="font-size: 13.6px">Awareness raising and demand promotion amongst users and service providers, as well as training (capacity building) </span><span style="font-size: 13.6px">to develop the skilled workforce needed by concessionaires can be beneficial alongside [[Portal:Financing and Funding|financial]] forms of public support.</span> |
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== Advantages and Disadvantages == | == Advantages and Disadvantages == | ||
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− | The key advantage of a concession is that, by removing the potential for others to sell within the concession area, it allows demand to be captured by a single supplier, giving them economies of scale, and makes it easier to forecast volume of sales and so easier for investors to forecast future revenues (whereas license-based price/tariff regulation only reduces price uncertainty). As well as attracting more private finance this may reduce required return on investment and hence finance costs, but it also removes the benefits of competition once the concession has been granted and so places heavier demand on regulation to protect users, though potential providers may be required to compete for the concession through a tender process. Concession approaches can be rigid, and require significant capacity within regulatory authorities to design approaches which attract private finance while avoiding over-exploitation of users. Concessions also, by their nature, create boundaries and so push investors towards project finance and thinking by limiting their ability to expand their business beyond pre-set borders or to continue it beyond the end of a concession period. For capital-intensive infrastructure-based means of electrification (grid and mini-grids), however, a concession may just represent recognition of a natural monopoly and the need for explicit arrangements for arrival of the grid, and it is for these that a concession is most likely to be appropriate. | + | The key advantage of a concession is that, by removing the potential for others to sell within the concession area, it allows demand to be captured by a single supplier, giving them economies of scale, and makes it easier to forecast volume of sales and so easier for investors to forecast future revenues (whereas license-based price/tariff regulation only reduces price uncertainty). As well as attracting more private [[Portal:Financing and Funding|finance]] this may reduce required return on investment and hence finance costs, but it also removes the benefits of competition once the concession has been granted and so places heavier demand on regulation to protect users, though potential providers may be required to compete for the concession through a tender process. Concession approaches can be rigid, and require significant capacity within regulatory authorities to design approaches which attract private finance while avoiding over-exploitation of users. Concessions also, by their nature, create boundaries and so push investors towards project finance and thinking by limiting their ability to expand their business beyond pre-set borders or to continue it beyond the end of a concession period. For capital-intensive infrastructure-based means of electrification ([[Portal:Grid|grid]] and [[Portal:Mini-grid|mini-grids]]), however, a concession may just represent recognition of a natural monopoly and the need for explicit arrangements for arrival of the grid, and it is for these that a concession is most likely to be appropriate. |
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− | == Further | + | == Further Information and Guidance == |
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− | *EUEI PDF (2014), Mini-grid Policy Toolkit: Policy and Business Frameworks for Successful Mini-grid Roll-outs | + | *EUEI PDF (2014), Mini-grid Policy Toolkit: Policy and Business Frameworks for Successful Mini-grid Roll-outs [http://www.euei-pdf.org/sites/default/files/field_publication_file/RECP_mini-grid_Policy_Toolkit_1pageview_(pdf,_17.6MB,_EN_0.pdf http://www.euei-pdf.org/sites/default/files/field_publication_file/RECP_mini-grid_Policy_Toolkit_1pageview_(pdf,_17.6MB,_EN_0.pdf] |
− | *IRENA (2016), Policies and regulations to support renewable energy mini-grid development through private sector involvement | + | *IRENA (2016), Policies and regulations to support renewable energy mini-grid development through private sector involvement [http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_Policies_Regulations_minigrids_2016.pdf http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_Policies_Regulations_mini-grids_2016.pdf] |
− | *Senegal. Agence Senegalaise d’Electrification Rurale (2009), Concession d’Electrification Rurale au Senegal, The Africa Electrification Initiative (AEI) Workshop, Maputo, Mozambique 9-12 Juin 2009. | + | *Senegal. Agence Senegalaise d’Electrification Rurale (2009), Concession d’Electrification Rurale au Senegal, The Africa Electrification Initiative (AEI) Workshop, Maputo, Mozambique 9-12 Juin 2009. [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAFRREGTOPENERGY/Resources/717305-1264695610003/6743444-1268073657582/15.4.Senegal.pdf http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAFRREGTOPENERGY/Resources/717305-1264695610003/6743444-1268073657582/15.4.Senegal.pdf]<br/> |
− | *World Bank, (2000), Regulatory Approaches to Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy: Case Studies from Six Developing Countries | + | *World Bank, (2000), Regulatory Approaches to Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy: Case Studies from Six Developing Countries [http://www.martinot.info/Martinot_Reiche_WB.pdf http://www.martinot.info/Martinot_Reiche_WB.pdf] |
− | * | + | *Senegal. OBA (2007), OBA in Senegal – Designing Technology-Neutral Concessions for Rural Electrification [https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/11034/396090SN0OBApp1140Electric01PUBLIC1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/11034/396090SN0OBApp1140Electric01PUBLIC1.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y] |
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− | Senegal. OBA (2007), OBA in Senegal – Designing Technology-Neutral Concessions for Rural Electrification | ||
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− | == | + | == Relevant Case Studies == |
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*[[NAE Case Study: Bangladesh, IDCOL Solar Home Systems|Bangladesh, IDCOL Solar Home Systems]]<br/> | *[[NAE Case Study: Bangladesh, IDCOL Solar Home Systems|Bangladesh, IDCOL Solar Home Systems]]<br/> | ||
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= License = | = License = | ||
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− | '''<span style="color:#FFFFFF | + | '''<span style="color:#FFFFFF"><span style="font-size: 13.6px">Definition</span></span>'''<br/> |
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'''<span><span></span></span><span><span></span></span><span><span>A non-exclusive permission granted by government (or regulator) to sell electricity or standalone systems. </span></span><span><span></span></span><span><span></span></span>''' | '''<span><span></span></span><span><span></span></span><span><span>A non-exclusive permission granted by government (or regulator) to sell electricity or standalone systems. </span></span><span><span></span></span><span><span></span></span>''' | ||
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− | == | + | == Interactions with other NAE Categories == |
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− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF">Technology</span><br/> |
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− | Grid | + | [[Portal:Grid|Gridsystems]] and larger grid-connected [[Portal:Mini-grid|mini-grids]] / distribution systems are usually licensed through a concession arrangement as, often, are larger isolated mini-grids. For smaller mini-grids, with lower and shorter-term capital investment, a licensing regime (with its non-exclusive right to sell electricity) may be more appropriate, with greater flexibility and a generally less demanding process balancing lack of protection from competition for the investor, while still providing the means to protect users through price/tariff regulation and setting technical and safety standards. (mini-grids below a certain size, are often unregulated, as the administrative burden (and costs) of regulation are seen as disproportionate to the protection it would provide to investors and users, and the right to operate instead of being granted through a general derogation from licensing). Without a concession, a key question for private mini-grid licensees will be what happens when the main grid arrives, and it may be beneficial to establish a compensation regime in the event of grid extension, to encourage private mini-grid investment in the interim. Standalone system providers are rarely subject to licensing (beyond general business licensing requirements) though they may be required to meet certain standards in order to access subsidies and tax exemptions. In part, this reflects both policy-makers’ and businesses’ perception that as product retailers rather than infrastructure providers or sellers of electricity itself they do not require licensing. Also, without long-term fixed capital investment, private companies have not needed the protection of a concession or license to attract private capital (and would regard it simply as a regulatory burden). With standalone system providers increasingly<br/>looking to pay-as-you-go arrangements, where they retain ownership of the system until the user has bought it through monthly payments, or even over its full life with the user simply paying for electricity used, more formal regulation of standalone system businesses may become more appropriate. |
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− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF">Delivery Model</span><br/> |
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Licensing may be regarded as unnecessary with a public delivery model, since one arm of the state is granting a license to another, though it can act as a mechanism for establishing independent and transparent oversight. With private and public-private delivery models, licensing is used to explicitly establish the right for the licensee to sell electricity (or a technology used to provide electricity) as the basis for attracting private participation and protecting users through standards and price controls. | Licensing may be regarded as unnecessary with a public delivery model, since one arm of the state is granting a license to another, though it can act as a mechanism for establishing independent and transparent oversight. With private and public-private delivery models, licensing is used to explicitly establish the right for the licensee to sell electricity (or a technology used to provide electricity) as the basis for attracting private participation and protecting users through standards and price controls. | ||
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− | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(205, 52, 0) | + | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(205, 52, 0)" | |
− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF">Price/Tariff Regulation</span> |
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One of the purposes of licensing is to provide the vehicle and framework for price/tariff regulation, with license withdrawal being the sanction for failure to comply with price/tariff regulation. Prices may be set on either a uniform or an individual basis. | One of the purposes of licensing is to provide the vehicle and framework for price/tariff regulation, with license withdrawal being the sanction for failure to comply with price/tariff regulation. Prices may be set on either a uniform or an individual basis. | ||
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− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF">Finance</span><br/> |
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− | The right to sell conveyed by a license is the most fundamental requirement for attracting private finance. A licensing regime may also provide a transparent regulatory framework to attract private investment (see below), and may be linked to access to grants, subsidies, tax exemptions and guarantees.<span style="font-size: 13.6px | + | The right to sell conveyed by a license is the most fundamental requirement for attracting private [[Portal:Financing and Funding|finance]]. A licensing regime may also provide a transparent regulatory framework to attract private investment (see below), and may be linked to access to grants, subsidies, tax exemptions and guarantees.<span style="font-size: 13.6px"></span> |
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− | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(0, 100, 100) | + | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(0, 100, 100)" | |
− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF">Non-Financial Interventions</span><br/> |
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− | National energy planning is key to establishing the optimum mix of technologies to meet electrification needs across the country, regardless of the regulatory model employed. Regulatory reform is the path to establishing any licensing framework, including quality and technical standards, and capacity building or technical assistance may be required if the key actors lack the capacity to undertake this regulatory reform. Awareness raising and demand promotion amongst users and service providers, as well as training (capacity building) to develop the skilled workforce needed by licensed electricity businesses can be beneficial alongside financial forms of public support. | + | National energy planning is key to establishing the optimum mix of technologies to meet electrification needs across the country, regardless of the regulatory model employed. Regulatory reform is the path to establishing any licensing framework, including quality and technical standards, and capacity building or technical assistance may be required if the key actors lack the capacity to undertake this regulatory reform. Awareness raising and demand promotion amongst users and service providers, as well as training (capacity building) to develop the skilled workforce needed by licensed electricity businesses, can be beneficial alongside financial forms of public support. |
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== Advantages and Disadvantages == | == Advantages and Disadvantages == | ||
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− | The key advantage of licensing electricity providers is that it provides the means to impose technical and quality standards and price controls, and thereby protect users, in return for the explicit right to operate. The clarity provided by a well-designed and managed licensing arrangement can serve to attract electricity providers, particularly if long-term capital investment is involved. If licensing is complex, bureaucratic and time-consuming, or imposes disproportionate costs, it may instead delay projects and discourage potential providers, which is the main disadvantage of licensing.<span style="font-size: 13.6px | + | The key advantage of licensing electricity providers is that it provides the means to impose technical and quality standards and price controls, and thereby protect users, in return for the explicit right to operate. The clarity provided by a well-designed and managed licensing arrangement can serve to attract electricity providers, particularly if long-term capital investment is involved. If licensing is complex, bureaucratic and time-consuming, or imposes disproportionate costs, it may instead delay projects and discourage potential providers, which is the main disadvantage of licensing.<span style="font-size: 13.6px"></span> |
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− | == Further | + | == Further Information and Guidance == |
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− | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(248, 192, 0) | + | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(248, 192, 0)" | <br/> |
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+ | *EUEI PDF (2014), Mini-grid Policy Toolkit: Policy and Business Frameworks for Successful Mini-grid Roll-outs [http://www.euei-pdf.org/sites/default/files/field_publication_file/RECP_MiniGrid_Policy_Toolkit_1pageview_(pdf,_17.6MB,_EN_0.pdf http://www.euei-pdf.org/sites/default/files/field_publication_file/RECP_mini-grid_Policy_Toolkit_1pageview_(pdf,_17.6MB,_EN_0.pdf] | ||
+ | *IRENA (2016), Policies and regulations to support renewable energy mini-grid development through private sector involvement [http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_Policies_Regulations_minigrids_2016.pdf http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_Policies_Regulations_mini-grids_2016.pdf] | ||
+ | *World Bank, (2000), Regulatory Approaches to Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy: Case Studies from Six Developing Countries [http://www.martinot.info/Martinot_Reiche_WB.pdf http://www.martinot.info/Martinot_Reiche_WB.pdf] | ||
+ | *World Bank. 2014. From the Bottom Up. How Small Power Producers and Mini-Grids Can Deliver Electrification and Renewable Energy in Africa. [https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/16571 https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/16571] | ||
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− | == | + | == Relevant Case Studies == |
− | {| | + | {| style="width:100%" cellspacing="1" cellpadding="1" border="1" |
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− | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(248, 192, 0) | + | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(248, 192, 0)" | <br/> |
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+ | *[[NAE Case Study: Cambodia “Light Touch” Regulation|Cambodia “Light Touch” Regulation]]<br/> | ||
+ | *[[NAE Case Study: Kenya, Off-Grid for Vision 2030|Kenya, Off-Grid for Vision 2030]]<br/> | ||
+ | *[[NAE Case Study: Rwanda, Sector-Wide Approach to Planning|Rwanda, Sector-Wide Approach to Planning]]<br/> | ||
+ | *[[NAE Case Study: Tanzania, Mini-Grids Regulatory Framework|Tanzania, Mini-Grids Regulatory Framework]]<br/> | ||
+ | |||
+ | |} | ||
+ | |||
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= Unregulated = | = Unregulated = | ||
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− | | style="width: 130px; background-color: rgb( | + | | style="width: 130px; background-color: rgb(248, 152, 0)" | |
− | '''<span style="color:#FFFFFF | + | '''<span style="color:#FFFFFF"><span style="font-size: 13.6px">Definition</span></span>'''<br/> |
− | | style="width: 618px | + | | style="width: 618px" | |
− | ''' | + | '''A regime under which anyone may sell electricity and/or standalone systems without any license or other permission, beyond that required for any business to operate, and without any regulatory control of electricity tariffs or standalone system prices. '''<br/> |
− | + | An unregulated regime may: | |
− | * | + | *Be explicit (ie law/regulation may state that there is no need for licensing, other permissions or regulatory approval of prices/tariffs), or implicit (in that there is no law or regulation) <br/> |
− | * | + | *Cover the entire country or a specific area (eg the area more than a certain distance from the national [[Portal:Grid|grid]])<br/> |
− | * | + | *Relate to one, several, or all technologies |
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− | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb( | + | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(0, 101, 0)" | |
− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF">Technology</span><br/> |
<br/> | <br/> | ||
− | | style="width: 616px | + | | style="width: 616px" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF"></span> |
− | + | [[Portal:Grid|Grid]] systems and larger grid-connected [[Portal:Mini-grid|mini-grids]] / distribution systems and isolated mini-grids are generally subject to some form of regulation to set technical and quality standards and allow for price/tariff regulation to protect users. Mini-grids below a certain size are often unregulated, as the administrative burden (and costs) of regulation are seen as disproportionate to the protection it would provide to investors and users, with the right to operate instead being granted through a general derogation from licensing. <br/> <br/>Standalone system providers are rarely subject to specific licensing requirements though they may be required to meet certain standards in order to access subsidies and tax exemptions. In part, this reflects both policy-makers’ and businesses’ perception that as product retailers rather than infrastructure providers or sellers of electricity itself they do not require licensing. Also, without long-term fixed capital investment, private standalone system companies have not needed the protection of a concession or license to attract private capital (and would regard it simply as a regulatory burden). (With standalone system providers increasingly looking to pay-as-you-go arrangements, where they retain ownership of the system until the user has bought it through monthly payments, or even over its full life with the user paying for electricity used, more formal regulation of standalone system businesses may become more appropriate.) | |
|- | |- | ||
− | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb( | + | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(248, 152, 0)" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF"></span><br/> |
− | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb( | + | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(52, 103, 152)" | |
− | < | + | <font color="#ffffff">Delivery Model</font> |
<br/> | <br/> | ||
− | | style="width: 616px | + | | style="width: 616px" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF"></span> |
− | + | Public delivery model based electrification may be unregulated where, as in the early stages of Vietnam’s electrification, multiple public institutions provide electricity to users, without central direction or oversight. (Though public electricity providers will often be controlled through the state organisational structure, and even in the context of a public delivery model a regulatory framework can act as a mechanism for establishing independent and transparent oversight.) Private and public-private delivery models which use infra-structure based means of providing electricity (ie [[Portal:Mini-grid|mini-grids]]) are generally subject to regulation in order to protect users under what is often effectively a monopoly even if no formal concession has been granted. Only where the means of electricity provision is very dispersed, as with very small mini-grids or standalone systems, is it usually regarded as appropriate to leave private or public-private electricity providers unregulated.<span style="font-size: 13.6px"></span> | |
|- | |- | ||
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− | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(32, 56, 100) | + | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(32, 56, 100)" | |
− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF">Finance</span><br/> |
<br/> | <br/> | ||
− | | style="width: 616px | + | | style="width: 616px" | <span style="color:#FFFFFF"></span> |
− | + | Grants and subsidies will often be linked to some form of regulation to ensure proper use of funds, and cross-subsidies between electricity providers are generally impracticable outside a regulatory framework. Some more indirect forms of public [[Portal:Financing and Funding|financial]] support, such as import tax exemptions, may be viable in the absence of regulation. An unregulated market may be considered unnecessary to attract private finance provided that the right to sell is clear, the privately-financed provider is not looking for protection from other providers (eg [[Portal:Grid|gridextension]]), and there is no concern that later introduction of price/tariff regulation might threaten returns on investment (ie generally where long-termed fixed capital investment is not required) – for instance where there are multiple [[Basic Energy Services - Solar PV (SHS, Solar Lanterns)|solar lantern]] suppliers. In a primarily privately financed context, with limited public financial support, payments from users are needed to fund operations and provide return on investment. | |
|- | |- | ||
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− | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(0, 100, 100) | + | | style="width: 117px; background-color: rgb(0, 100, 100)" | |
− | <span style="color:#FFFFFF | + | <span style="color:#FFFFFF">Non-Financial Interventions</span><br/> |
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− | | style="width: 616px | + | | style="width: 616px" | |
− | National energy planning is key to establishing the optimum mix of technologies to meet electrification needs across the country, regardless of the | + | National energy planning is key to establishing the optimum mix of technologies to meet electrification needs across the country, regardless of the regulatory model employed. If regulation is deemed unnecessary, regulatory reform is unlikely to be required (unless this necessitates removal of existing regulations) and this would appear to imply little need for capacity building or technical assistance to policy makers and regulators. However, lack of regulation is itself a regulatory choice and its implications must <span style="font-size: 13.6px">be understood if unforeseen and unwanted consequences are to be avoided. Though forms of public [[Portal:Financing and Funding|financial]] support are </span><span style="font-size: 13.6px">limited without regulation, non-financial support such as awareness raising and demand promotion amongst users and </span><span style="font-size: 13.6px">service providers, making market information available, and providing training to develop the skilled workforce needed by </span><span style="font-size: 13.6px">businesses can support market growth.</span> |
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== Advantages and Disadvantages (Including Level of Electricity Provided) == | == Advantages and Disadvantages (Including Level of Electricity Provided) == | ||
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− | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb( | + | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(248, 152, 0)" | <br/> |
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− | + | The main advantage of unregulated electricity provision is the absence of bureaucracy, costs and delays and the opportunity this provides to businesses to move swiftly and innovate, and hence to accelerate electricity access provision. It also avoids the burden on state institutions of designing and managing a regulatory system. The major disadvantage is lack of clarity and protection from competition (including [[Portal:Grid|grid]] extension) for private investors and businesses, while users will rely solely on market competition for protection from over-pricing and poor quality and even unsafe products and services. | |
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− | == Further | + | == Further Information and Guidance == |
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− | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb( | + | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(248, 152, 0)" | <br/> |
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− | *<span> | + | *<span>EUEI PDF (2014), Mini-grid Policy Toolkit: Policy and Business Frameworks for Successful Mini-grid Roll-outs </span><span>[http://www.euei-pdf.org/sites/default/files/field_publication_file/RECP_MiniGrid_Policy_Toolkit_1pageview_(pdf,_17.6MB,_EN_0.pdf http://www.euei-pdf.org/sites/default/files/field_publication_file/RECP_mini-grid_Policy_Toolkit_1pageview_(pdf,_17.6MB,_EN_0.pdf]</span> |
+ | *<span>IRENA </span><span>(2016), Policies and regulations to support renewable energy mini-grid development through private sector involvement </span><span>[http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_Policies_Regulations_minigrids_2016.pdf http://]</span><span>[http://www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_Policies_Regulations_minigrids_2016.pdf www.irena.org/DocumentDownloads/Publications/IRENA_Policies_ Regulations_mini-grids_2016.pdf]</span> | ||
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− | == | + | == Relevant Case Studies == |
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− | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb( | + | | style="width: 10px; background-color: rgb(248, 152, 0)" | <br/> |
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− | + | *[[NAE Case Study: Ethiopia, Solar Market Development|Ethiopia, Solar Market Development]] | |
− | + | *[[NAE Case Study: Kenya, Off-Grid for Vision 2030|Kenya, Off-Grid for Vision 2030]] | |
− | + | *[[NAE Case Study: Nepal, Rural Energy Development Programme|Nepal, Rural Energy Development Programme]] | |
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− | *[[NAE Case Study: Ethiopia, Solar Market Development|Ethiopia, Solar Market Development]] | ||
− | *[[NAE Case Study: Kenya, Off-Grid for Vision 2030|Kenya, Off-Grid for Vision 2030]] | ||
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− | *[[NAE Case Study: Nepal, Rural Energy Development Programme|Nepal, Rural Energy Development Programme]] | ||
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{{NAE Acknowledgements}} | {{NAE Acknowledgements}} | ||
+ | [[Category:Mini-grid]] | ||
+ | [[Category:Legal_Framework]] | ||
+ | [[Category:Grid]] | ||
+ | [[Category:Energy_Access]] | ||
[[Category:NAE]] | [[Category:NAE]] |
Latest revision as of 15:47, 30 July 2018
![]() |
Legal Basis: The basis on which organisations are legally entitled to sell electricity
Concession
Definition |
An exclusive right (monopoly) granted by government to sell electricity or standalone systems A concession may:
Concessions are usually granted to attract private investment by guaranteeing the investor protection from competition, or to protect public investment. |
Interactions with other NAE Categories
Technology
|
Grid systems and larger grid-connected mini-grids / distribution systems and isolated mini-grids almost always require concessions (because of the substantial investment required). As a result, the right to transmit and sell electricity is often reserved to the national grid company and/or mini-grid/distribution system operator (at least within the area they reach). For smaller mini-grids, with lower, shorter-term capital investment, a license (which grants a non-exclusive right to sell electricity) may be seen as more appropriate, and mini-grids below a certain size are often unregulated. A key question for private mini-grid investors will be what happens when the main grid arrives? Grid extension into a mini-grid concession area within the concession period may be prohibited, or there may be explicit provision for compensation and transfer of assets to grid ownership. Grid and mini-grid concessions thus often interrelate (with each preventing or having explicit provision for extending into the other’s area). | |
Delivery Model
|
Public delivery models are frequently combined with what are effectively concessions, though the monopoly may be created by, for instance, reserving the right to sell electricity to a national utility company, and may not therefore be labelled as a concession. Oversight and control may then be through organisational hierarchy rather than any explicit regulatory framework. Concessions are used to attract private participation in private and public-private models and may be the means through which public-private models are established. | |
Price/Tariff Regulation
|
Where a concession is granted prices will almost certainly be regulated both to enable private investors to estimate revenues over the concession period and to protect users and ensure that the concessionaire is not over-exploiting their monopoly position. This regulation may be through the terms of the concession itself, rather than through a wider framework. Prices may be set on either a uniform or an individual basis. | |
Finance
|
A concession is a means of attracting private finance, by offering the investor higher levels of sales (in the absence of competition) and lower risk in predicting those sales. It may also be used to protect public investment in infrastructure such as grid systems, and as a means of channelling public financial support into electricity provision. | |
Non-Financial Interventions
|
National energy planning is key to establishing the optimum mix of technologies to meet electrification needs across the country, regardless of the regulatory model employed. Institutional restructuring (eg of the national utility company) and regulatory reform may be needed to enable concessions to be established and capacity building or technical assistance may be required if the key actors lack the capacity to undertake this regulatory reform or design concession arrangements. Awareness raising and demand promotion amongst users and service providers, as well as training (capacity building) to develop the skilled workforce needed by concessionaires can be beneficial alongside financial forms of public support. |
Advantages and Disadvantages
The key advantage of a concession is that, by removing the potential for others to sell within the concession area, it allows demand to be captured by a single supplier, giving them economies of scale, and makes it easier to forecast volume of sales and so easier for investors to forecast future revenues (whereas license-based price/tariff regulation only reduces price uncertainty). As well as attracting more private finance this may reduce required return on investment and hence finance costs, but it also removes the benefits of competition once the concession has been granted and so places heavier demand on regulation to protect users, though potential providers may be required to compete for the concession through a tender process. Concession approaches can be rigid, and require significant capacity within regulatory authorities to design approaches which attract private finance while avoiding over-exploitation of users. Concessions also, by their nature, create boundaries and so push investors towards project finance and thinking by limiting their ability to expand their business beyond pre-set borders or to continue it beyond the end of a concession period. For capital-intensive infrastructure-based means of electrification (grid and mini-grids), however, a concession may just represent recognition of a natural monopoly and the need for explicit arrangements for arrival of the grid, and it is for these that a concession is most likely to be appropriate. |
Further Information and Guidance
|
Relevant Case Studies
License
Definition |
A non-exclusive permission granted by government (or regulator) to sell electricity or standalone systems. Licenses are employed to enable regulatory authorities to control who provides electricity or electricity goods, to ensure that they meet quality and safety standards and to allow price controls. At the same time licensing is a means of making clear that electricity providers are entitled to sell – without which private financiers may be reluctant to invest. A license may:
|
Interactions with other NAE Categories
Technology
|
Gridsystems and larger grid-connected mini-grids / distribution systems are usually licensed through a concession arrangement as, often, are larger isolated mini-grids. For smaller mini-grids, with lower and shorter-term capital investment, a licensing regime (with its non-exclusive right to sell electricity) may be more appropriate, with greater flexibility and a generally less demanding process balancing lack of protection from competition for the investor, while still providing the means to protect users through price/tariff regulation and setting technical and safety standards. (mini-grids below a certain size, are often unregulated, as the administrative burden (and costs) of regulation are seen as disproportionate to the protection it would provide to investors and users, and the right to operate instead of being granted through a general derogation from licensing). Without a concession, a key question for private mini-grid licensees will be what happens when the main grid arrives, and it may be beneficial to establish a compensation regime in the event of grid extension, to encourage private mini-grid investment in the interim. Standalone system providers are rarely subject to licensing (beyond general business licensing requirements) though they may be required to meet certain standards in order to access subsidies and tax exemptions. In part, this reflects both policy-makers’ and businesses’ perception that as product retailers rather than infrastructure providers or sellers of electricity itself they do not require licensing. Also, without long-term fixed capital investment, private companies have not needed the protection of a concession or license to attract private capital (and would regard it simply as a regulatory burden). With standalone system providers increasingly | |
Delivery Model
|
Licensing may be regarded as unnecessary with a public delivery model, since one arm of the state is granting a license to another, though it can act as a mechanism for establishing independent and transparent oversight. With private and public-private delivery models, licensing is used to explicitly establish the right for the licensee to sell electricity (or a technology used to provide electricity) as the basis for attracting private participation and protecting users through standards and price controls. | |
Price/Tariff Regulation |
One of the purposes of licensing is to provide the vehicle and framework for price/tariff regulation, with license withdrawal being the sanction for failure to comply with price/tariff regulation. Prices may be set on either a uniform or an individual basis. | |
Finance
|
The right to sell conveyed by a license is the most fundamental requirement for attracting private finance. A licensing regime may also provide a transparent regulatory framework to attract private investment (see below), and may be linked to access to grants, subsidies, tax exemptions and guarantees. | |
Non-Financial Interventions
|
National energy planning is key to establishing the optimum mix of technologies to meet electrification needs across the country, regardless of the regulatory model employed. Regulatory reform is the path to establishing any licensing framework, including quality and technical standards, and capacity building or technical assistance may be required if the key actors lack the capacity to undertake this regulatory reform. Awareness raising and demand promotion amongst users and service providers, as well as training (capacity building) to develop the skilled workforce needed by licensed electricity businesses, can be beneficial alongside financial forms of public support. |
Advantages and Disadvantages
The key advantage of licensing electricity providers is that it provides the means to impose technical and quality standards and price controls, and thereby protect users, in return for the explicit right to operate. The clarity provided by a well-designed and managed licensing arrangement can serve to attract electricity providers, particularly if long-term capital investment is involved. If licensing is complex, bureaucratic and time-consuming, or imposes disproportionate costs, it may instead delay projects and discourage potential providers, which is the main disadvantage of licensing. |
Further Information and Guidance
|
Relevant Case Studies
Unregulated
Definition |
A regime under which anyone may sell electricity and/or standalone systems without any license or other permission, beyond that required for any business to operate, and without any regulatory control of electricity tariffs or standalone system prices. An unregulated regime may:
|
Interactions with other NAE Categories
Technology
|
Grid systems and larger grid-connected mini-grids / distribution systems and isolated mini-grids are generally subject to some form of regulation to set technical and quality standards and allow for price/tariff regulation to protect users. Mini-grids below a certain size are often unregulated, as the administrative burden (and costs) of regulation are seen as disproportionate to the protection it would provide to investors and users, with the right to operate instead being granted through a general derogation from licensing. | |
Delivery Model
|
Public delivery model based electrification may be unregulated where, as in the early stages of Vietnam’s electrification, multiple public institutions provide electricity to users, without central direction or oversight. (Though public electricity providers will often be controlled through the state organisational structure, and even in the context of a public delivery model a regulatory framework can act as a mechanism for establishing independent and transparent oversight.) Private and public-private delivery models which use infra-structure based means of providing electricity (ie mini-grids) are generally subject to regulation in order to protect users under what is often effectively a monopoly even if no formal concession has been granted. Only where the means of electricity provision is very dispersed, as with very small mini-grids or standalone systems, is it usually regarded as appropriate to leave private or public-private electricity providers unregulated. | |
Finance
|
Grants and subsidies will often be linked to some form of regulation to ensure proper use of funds, and cross-subsidies between electricity providers are generally impracticable outside a regulatory framework. Some more indirect forms of public financial support, such as import tax exemptions, may be viable in the absence of regulation. An unregulated market may be considered unnecessary to attract private finance provided that the right to sell is clear, the privately-financed provider is not looking for protection from other providers (eg gridextension), and there is no concern that later introduction of price/tariff regulation might threaten returns on investment (ie generally where long-termed fixed capital investment is not required) – for instance where there are multiple solar lantern suppliers. In a primarily privately financed context, with limited public financial support, payments from users are needed to fund operations and provide return on investment. | |
Non-Financial Interventions
|
National energy planning is key to establishing the optimum mix of technologies to meet electrification needs across the country, regardless of the regulatory model employed. If regulation is deemed unnecessary, regulatory reform is unlikely to be required (unless this necessitates removal of existing regulations) and this would appear to imply little need for capacity building or technical assistance to policy makers and regulators. However, lack of regulation is itself a regulatory choice and its implications must be understood if unforeseen and unwanted consequences are to be avoided. Though forms of public financial support are limited without regulation, non-financial support such as awareness raising and demand promotion amongst users and service providers, making market information available, and providing training to develop the skilled workforce needed by businesses can support market growth. |
Advantages and Disadvantages (Including Level of Electricity Provided)
The main advantage of unregulated electricity provision is the absence of bureaucracy, costs and delays and the opportunity this provides to businesses to move swiftly and innovate, and hence to accelerate electricity access provision. It also avoids the burden on state institutions of designing and managing a regulatory system. The major disadvantage is lack of clarity and protection from competition (including grid extension) for private investors and businesses, while users will rely solely on market competition for protection from over-pricing and poor quality and even unsafe products and services. |
Further Information and Guidance
|
Relevant Case Studies
References
Authors
Authors: Mary Willcox, Dean Cooper
Acknowledgements
The Review was prepared by Mary Willcox and Dean Cooper of Practical Action Consulting working with Hadley Taylor, Silvia Cabriolu-Poddu and Christina Stuart of the EU Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility (EUEIPDF) and Michael Koeberlein and Caspar Priesemann of the Energising Development Programme (EnDev). It is based on a literature review, stakeholder consultations. The categorization framework in the review tool is based on the EUEI/PDF / Practical Action publication "Building Energy Access Markets - A Value Chain Analysis of Key Energy Market Systems".
A wider range of stakeholders were consulted during its preparation and we would particularly like to thank the following for their valuable contributions and insights: - Jeff Felten, AfDB - Marcus Wiemann and other members, ARE - Guilherme Collares Pereira, EdP - David Otieno Ochieng, EUEI-PDF - Silvia Luisa Escudero Santos Ascarza, EUEI-PDF - Nico Peterschmidt, Inensus - John Tkacik, REEEP - Khorommbi Bongwe, South Africa: Department of Energy - Rashid Ali Abdallah, African Union Commission - Nicola Bugatti, ECREEE - Getahun Moges Kifle, Ethiopian Energy Authority - Mario Merchan Andres, EUEI-PDF - Tatjana Walter-Breidenstein, EUEI-PDF - Rebecca Symington, Mlinda Foundation - Marcel Raats, RVO.NL - Nico Tyabji, Sunfunder -
Any feedback would be very welcome. If you have any comments or enquires please contact: mary.willcox@practicalaction.org.uk, benjamin.attigah@euei-pdf.org, or caspar.priesemann@giz.de.
Download the Tool as a Power Point: https://energypedia.info/images/a/aa/National_Approaches_to_Electrification_-_Review_of_Options.pptx