Difference between revisions of "Subsidies"

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<span lang="EN-GB"><font face="Arial">Normally subsidies would not be necessary in a perfect world. There is a lot of momentum to ''not'' subsidize infrastructure expansion but make this the responsibility of the private sector, and let it be the outcome of market development. However, to realize this in the presence of prevailing market failures, non conducive policy frameworks and lack of supportive concessional financing, and generally low disposable incomes for the target population, much more capacity development and institutional reforms are required than is realistically possible. It is nearly impossible to address all these shortcomings simultaneously and expect markets to take care of public service delivery. Hence, progress and achievements are greatly facilitated when subsidies can be used to provide smart incentives.</font></span>
 
  
= <span lang="EN-GB"><font face="Arial">Introduction</font></span>  =
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[[Portal:Financing and Funding|► Back to Financing and Funding Portal]]
  
<span lang="EN-GB"><font face="Arial">Indeed, subsidies were considered ''taboo'' by the international development community for a long time, but momentum is slowly gaining in favour of newly applying limited subsidies. Such subsidies should be designed to stimulate and initiate markets, avoid supporting the costs of operation and/or consumption in the long-run, and have a credible and transparent exit strategy. EnDev incorporated subsidies as an efficient and transparent mechanism to accelerate access to modern energy in rural and peri-urban areas.</font></span>
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= Introduction =
  
<span lang="EN-GB"><font face="Arial">We should not forget that the infrastructure in industrialized countries was built with a high level of subsidies and public support! Electricity has been around for more than 100 years now, but the bulk of the SSA population still does not have access and remains in the dark. This in itself could be sufficient reason to develop an emergency program to correct this and apply subsidies accordingly.</font></span>
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Normally subsidies would not be necessary in a perfect world. There is a lot of momentum to not subsidize infrastructure expansion but make this the responsibility of the private sector, and let it be the outcome of market development. However, to realize this in the presence of prevailing market failures, non conducive policy frameworks and lack of supportive concessional financing, and generally low disposable incomes for the target population, much more capacity development and institutional reforms are required than is realistically possible. It is nearly impossible to address all these shortcomings simultaneously and expect markets to take care of public service delivery. Hence, progress and achievements are greatly facilitated when subsidies can be used to provide smart incentives.
  
<span lang="EN-GB"><font face="Arial">Sometimes pure logic or economic analysis fails to indicate that subsidies should be awarded after all: modern technologies are often cheaper in terms of life cycle costs / levelized energy costs&nbsp;compared to prevailing traditional technologies and services; data clearly shows that 4-7 month payback times exist for investing in modern lighting services. Yet, people are not investing on a large scale as could be expected. An explanation is that poor households already spend one third of their income on traditional energy like candles, kerosene and fuel wood and have no means to invest in modern technology, however urgently they are willing to do so. Subsidies really do make a difference, for households to invest in the modern technology and for the private sector to develop the infrastructure to deliver such technology. It is important to face and accept the basic trade-off: speed vs. sustainability. Access is long overdue and the focus should be on realizing this first, but in a sustainable manner and using minimum levels of subsidy.</font></span>
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<br/>Indeed, subsidies were considered ''taboo'' by the international development community for a long time, but momentum is slowly gaining in favour of newly applying limited subsidies. Such subsidies should be designed to stimulate and initiate markets, avoid supporting the costs of operation and/or consumption in the long-run, and have a credible and transparent exit strategy. EnDev incorporated subsidies as an efficient and transparent mechanism to accelerate access to modern energy in rural and peri-urban areas.
  
<span lang="EN-GB"><font face="Arial">It helps to make the subsidy support [http://www.endev.info/wiki/index.php/Transparency_as_precondition_for_reforming_subsidies transparent]; in most countries today, it is impossible to indicate the contribution of subsidies in the supply of grid electricity. Most likely these subsidies are huge, compounded throughout the supply chain: the generation capacity is subsidized, the fuel is subsidized or detaxed, the expansion of the transmission and distribution network is subsidized, connection fees and tariffs are subsidized, etc. Revenues from consumers do not cover the full costs of generation, transmission, distribution and bill collection.</font></span>
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<br/>We should not forget that the infrastructure in industrialized countries was built with a high level of subsidies and public support! Electricity has been around for more than 100 years now, but the bulk of the SSA population still does not have access and remains in the dark. This in itself could be sufficient reason to develop an emergency program to correct this and apply subsidies accordingly.
  
<span lang="EN-GB"><font face="Arial">In Rwanda</font></span>[[#_ftn1|<span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'; mso-ansi-language: en-gb; mso-fareast-font-family: calibri; mso-fareast-language: en-us; mso-bidi-language: ar-sa; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt">[1]</span></span></span></span></span>]]<span lang="EN-GB"><font face="Arial"> the electricity Roll-out program intends to connect 250,000 new customers over the next few years and applies a beneficiary contribution of less than 10% of the real cost of connection. It is not phrased as a subsidy, but effectively it is; imagine what could have been done with this amount of money in support of finding modern energy solutions for all rural households! In Senegal</font></span>[[#_ftn2|<span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 10pt; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'; mso-ansi-language: en-gb; mso-fareast-font-family: calibri; mso-fareast-language: en-us; mso-bidi-language: ar-sa; mso-bidi-font-size: 11.0pt">[2]</span></span></span></span></span>]]<span lang="EN-GB"><font face="Arial"> several concessions have been awarded for increasing access to electricity; the average subsidy for a new connection in concession areas is about $350; alternatively, one could hand out for 5-7 free PV lanterns for the same amount.</font></span>  
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Sometimes pure logic or economic analysis fails to indicate that subsidies should be awarded after all: modern technologies are often cheaper in terms of life cycle costs / levelized energy costs compared to prevailing traditional technologies and services; data clearly shows that 4-7 month payback times exist for investing in modern lighting services. Yet, people are not investing on a large scale as could be expected. An explanation is that poor households already spend one third of their income on traditional energy like candles, kerosene and fuel wood and have no means to invest in modern technology, however urgently they are willing to do so. Subsidies really do make a difference, for households to invest in the modern technology and for the private sector to develop the infrastructure to deliver such technology. It is important to face and accept the basic trade-off: speed vs. sustainability. Access is long overdue and the focus should be on realizing this first, but in a sustainable manner and using minimum levels of subsidy.<br/>
  
<span lang="EN-GB"><font face="Arial">Only a [http://www.endev.info/wiki/index.php/Transparency_as_precondition_for_reforming_subsidies transparent ]cost and price structure lays the basis for continued discussion and optimization of the support given, the more so since subsidies always remain the outcome of a political process. Although this process cannot or should not be stopped, the subsidies it awards should be made transparent so that beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries alike understand where the support went.</font></span>
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It helps to make the subsidy support [[Transparency as Precondition for Reforming Subsidies|transparent]]; in most countries today, it is impossible to indicate the contribution of subsidies in the supply of grid electricity. Most likely these subsidies are huge, compounded throughout the supply chain: the generation capacity is subsidized, the fuel is subsidized or detaxed, the expansion of the transmission and distribution network is subsidized, connection fees and tariffs are subsidized, etc. Revenues from consumers do not cover the full costs of generation, transmission, distribution and bill collection.
  
<span lang="EN-GB"><font face="Arial"></font></span><u>Source</u>: Robert vd Plas, Florian Ziegler in "EnDev Discussion Paper April 2010: Electricity Access for All - Illussions and Solutions"
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<br/>
<div style="mso-element: footnote-list"><div style="border-right: medium none; padding-right: 0cm; border-top: medium none; padding-left: 0cm; padding-bottom: 4pt; border-left: medium none; padding-top: 0cm; border-bottom: #4f81bd 1pt solid; mso-element: para-border-div">[[#_ftnref1|<span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 9pt; font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'times new roman'"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 9pt; font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'; mso-ansi-language: en-us; mso-fareast-font-family: calibri; mso-fareast-language: en-us; mso-bidi-language: ar-sa; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'times new roman'">[1]</span></span></span></span></span>]]<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 9pt; font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'times new roman'"> Lighting Africa Country Study (work in progress)</span></div><div id="ftn2" style="mso-element: footnote">
 
[[#_ftnref2|<span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 9pt; font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'times new roman'"><span style="mso-special-character: footnote"><span class="MsoFootnoteReference"><span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 9pt; font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'; mso-ansi-language: en-us; mso-fareast-font-family: calibri; mso-fareast-language: en-us; mso-bidi-language: ar-sa; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'times new roman'">[2]</span></span></span></span></span>]]<span lang="EN-US" style="font-size: 9pt; font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'; mso-bidi-font-size: 10.0pt; mso-bidi-font-family: 'times new roman'"> Lighting Africa Country Study (work in progress)</span>
 
</div></div>
 
<br>
 
  
= Typology  =
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In Rwanda[[#ftn1|[1]the]] electricity Roll-out program intends to connect 250,000 new customers over the next few years and applies a beneficiary contribution of less than 10% of the real cost of connection. It is not phrased as a subsidy, but effectively it is; imagine what could have been done with this amount of money in support of finding modern energy solutions for all rural households! In Senegal [[#ftn2|[2]]] several concessions have been awarded for increasing access to electricity; the average subsidy for a new connection in concession areas is about $350; alternatively, one could hand out for 5-7 free PV lanterns for the same amount.
  
....
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<br/>
  
<br>
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Only a [[Transparency as Precondition for Reforming Subsidies|transparent cost]] and price structure lays the basis for continued discussion and optimization of the support given, the more so since subsidies always remain the outcome of a political process. Although this process cannot or should not be stopped, the subsidies it awards should be made transparent so that beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries alike understand where the support went.
  
= Transparency =
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<u>Source</u>: Robert vd Plas, Florian Ziegler in "EnDev Discussion Paper April 2010: Electricity Access for All - Illussions and Solutions"
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<div><div style="border-right: medium none; padding-right: 0cm; border-top: medium none; padding-left: 0cm; padding-bottom: 4pt; border-left: medium none; padding-top: 0cm; border-bottom: 1pt solid">[[#ftnref1|[1]]]<span style="font-size: 9pt; font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'" lang="EN-US">Lighting Africa Country Study (work in progress)</span><br/><span style="font-size: 9pt; font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'" lang="EN-US"></span></div><div id="ftn2">
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[[#ftnref2|[2]]]<span style="font-size: 9pt; font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'" lang="EN-US">Lighting Africa Country Study (work in progress)</span>
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</div></div>
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<br/>
  
<span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'"><span id="1271945529638S" style="display: none">&nbsp;</span>GTZ Position&nbsp;(Subsidies….A Think Piece; Fuel Price Index; Access for All – Illusions and Solutions; REN21 etc.): Mehr Transparenz über Kosten und Preise ist die Voraussetzung für eine vermehrte Diskussion/Partizipation und kann zum Abbau von Subventionen führen. Es gibt zwar viele Lobbygruppen, die ein Interesse an Intransparenz haben. Dennoch nutzt die Transparenz der Politik letztlich, weil sie damit zusätzliche Argumente für den Abbau von Subventionen erhält. </span><span style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'">In DE wurde mit dem 20. Subventionsbericht (2003) ebenfalls eine Neuabgrenzung der Finanzhilfen vorgenommen, die den Regelungen der EU-Energiesteuerrichtlinie (RiLi 2003/96/EG) entspricht und für mehr Transparenz sorgt.</span>
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= Direct and Indirect Subsidies =
  
<u>Siehe dazu auch</u>: '''<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'; mso-ansi-language: en-gb">GSI/UNEP, April 2010: “[http://www.globalsubsidies.org/files/assets/transparency_ffs.pdf Gaining Traction: The importance of transparency in accelerating the reform of fossil-fuel subsidies]” &lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;</span>'''
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<span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"></span>[[Financing Mechanisms for Cookstove Dissemination#What Distinguishes Direct from Indirect Subsidies.3F|► Read about what distinguishes indirect and direct subsidies here]]<br/>
  
Aus dieser Studie:
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<br/>
  
'''Transparency as a foundation for reform'''
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= Smart Subsidies =
  
<br>
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<span style="background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);"></span>[[Financing Mechanisms for Cookstove Dissemination#Smart Subsidies|► Read about Smart Subsidies here]]<br/>
  
<u>Transparency can influence reform in at least four ways (Hale, 2008):</u>  
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<br/>
  
1. by institutionalizing public discourse: the act of disclosure starts a dialogue between the discloser and
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= Transparency =
 
 
interested parties;
 
 
 
2. by compelling actors to tell the truth, making it difficult for discourse to be manipulated by one “loud,”
 
 
 
deceitful actor;
 
 
 
3. by cutting through the flood of information and often contradictory claims to focus attention on facts;
 
 
 
and
 
 
 
4. by promoting self-reflection within the organization or government, compelling actors to comply with
 
 
 
their own standards and norms.
 
 
 
<br>
 
 
 
In considering the extent to which improving transparency could assist reform, the key consideration appears
 
 
 
to be one of ensuring its relevance. For transparency to be useful, information users and providers must desire
 
 
 
disclosure of the information and see how such transparency can help meet their objectives.
 
 
 
Improved information about fossil-fuel subsidies, in particular, can help governments meet their reform
 
 
 
objectives. At the simplest level, information about the subsidy and its effects facilitates an assessment of its
 
 
 
costs and benefits and, therefore, of the implications of reform. Making this information publicly available
 
 
 
increases awareness of the effects of existing policies and allows public input to decision-making (Wolfe and
 
 
 
Helmer, 2007).
 
 
 
Many governments understand the economic, social and environmental problems created by subsidies, but
 
 
 
are under political pressure to maintain them. Transparency can expose those winners and losers created by
 
 
 
subsidies and therefore help to broaden support for reform (Victor, 2009)....
 
 
 
Read more:[http://www.globalsubsidies.org/files/assets/transparency_ffs.pdf http://www.globalsubsidies.org/files/assets/transparency_ffs.pdf]
 
 
 
&nbsp;
 
 
 
<br>
 
 
 
'''<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'; mso-ansi-language: en-us">Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) - "The Effects of Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Reform: A review of modelling and empirical studies"</span>'''<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'; mso-ansi-language: en-us"> The Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) releases the publication of Jennifer Ellis’ paper “The Effects of Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Reform: A review of modelling and empirical studies.” This is the second paper to be published in the series Untold Billions: Fossil-fuel subsidies, their impacts and the path to reform.&nbsp;Subsidies are powerful instruments and when granted to fossil fuels, which are at the heart of all modern economies, subsidies have impacts throughout the economy, society and environment. Understanding the complex trade-offs between the different impacts of subsidy reform is a challenge for any government considering phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies.&nbsp;In this report, Jennifer Ellis provides a detailed literature review, focusing on the six modeling studies in the last 20 years that have attempted to analyze global impacts of subsidies for all fuels.&nbsp; The studies mostly considered effects on greenhouse gas emissions and gross domestic product, but very little of the work has considered other environmental impacts or social impacts.&nbsp; The paper highlights a number of areas where further research should be undertaken but concludes that there is already enough evidence to demonstrate the significant environmental and economic benefits of phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies, and recommends that policy-makers do not delay in beginning the reform process.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;</span>
 
 
 
'''<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'; mso-ansi-language: en-us">Download at</span>'''<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'; mso-ansi-language: en-us">: </span><span style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'">[http://www.globalsubsidies.org/en/research/economic-social-and-environmental-effects <span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: en-us">http://www.globalsubsidies.org/en/research/economic-social-and-environmental-effects</span>] </span><span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'; mso-ansi-language: en-us">.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;</span>
 
 
 
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'; mso-ansi-language: en-us">'''EARTH TRACK: EIA Energy Subsidy Estimates: A Review of Assumptions and Omissions'''&nbsp; &lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;</span>
 
 
 
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'; mso-ansi-language: en-us">This Review provides a detailed look at gaps in federal tracking of energy subsidies in the United States. In addition to evaluating the research approach used by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the Review assesses how key assumptions and omissions in EIA's work resulted in a substantial undercounting of federal energy subsidies and an inaccurate portrayal of subsidy distribution across fuels.&nbsp; EIA estimates are also placed in the context of other assessments of domestic energy subsidies conducted over the past thirty years.&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;</span>
 
 
 
'''<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'; mso-ansi-language: en-us">Read more:</span>'''<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'; mso-ansi-language: en-us"> [http://earthtrack.net/files/uploaded_files/EIA%20subsidy%20review%20final_17Mar10.pdf http://earthtrack.net/files/uploaded_files/EIA%20subsidy%20review%20final_17Mar10.pdf] &lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;</span>
 
 
 
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'; mso-ansi-language: en-us">'''IMF Note - Petroleum Product Subsidies: Costly, Inequitable, and Rising''' Petroleum product subsidies have again started to rise with the rebound in international prices. This note reviews recent developments in subsidy levels and argues that it is necessary to reform the policy framework for setting petroleum product prices in order to reduce the fiscal burden of these subsidies and to address climate change. In 2003, global consumer subsidies for petroleum products totaled nearly $60 billion. '''Read more:''' </span><span style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'">[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1005.pdf <span lang="EN-US" style="mso-ansi-language: en-us">http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1005.pdf</span>]&lt;o:p&gt;&lt;/o:p&gt;</span>
 
 
 
<br>
 
 
 
<br>
 
 
 
<br>
 
 
 
<br>
 
 
 
<font face="TradeGothic" size="2"><font face="TradeGothic" size="2">&nbsp;</font></font>
 
 
 
[[Category:Financing,_promotion_schemes_and_subsidies]]
 
 
 
= Subsidies for Solar Home&nbsp;System Promotion&nbsp;  =
 
 
 
Im vorliegenden Bericht werden verschiedene Ansätze von Finanzierungs- und Subventionsstrategien für Solar Home Systems (SHS) dargestellt, die im Rahmen der deutsch-niederländischen Partnerschaft Energising Development von der GTZ eingesetzt werden. Darüber hinaus werden einige andere Projekte der GTZ und anderer Geber vorgestellt, die von Interesse für EnDev sein könnten. Ziel des Berichtes ist die Darbietung eines komprimierten Überblicks über den aktuellen Stand der angewandten Strategien und Ansätze zur Verbreitung und Förderung von SHS.
 
 
 
Für ein besseres Verständnis der im Kapitel 3 konzentriert dargestellten Länderprojekte soll zunächst in Kapitel 2 ein kurzer Überblick über die verwendeten Begriffe und Kategorien aus den Bereichen Verbreitung und Subventionen von SHS gegeben werden. Für eine vertiefte Darstellung zu Strategien und Design von Subventionsmodellen wird hier auf die aktuelle für die GTZ erarbeitete Studie von Kilian Reiche „Energy Subsidies and (local) Private Sector Participation Controversial Issues and Recommendations“ verwiesen, sowie auf die Literaturliste (Kapitel 5).
 
 
 
Im Kapitel 3 gliedert sich die Darstellung der verschiedenen Länderbeispiele nach einer kurzen Beschreibung der Projekte in drei Teile:
 
 
 
1. Die wesentlichen Erfahrungen des Projektes werden zusammengefasst,
 
 
 
2. Eine Infobox bündelt schematisch die wichtigsten Informationen zum Projekt
 
 
 
3. In einem Schaubildern werden die tatsächlichen Finanz- und Subventionsflüsse bei der Verbreitung anhand eines Beispiel SHS abgebildet.
 
  
Je nach Tiefe der zu Verfügung gestellten Daten und dem Entwicklungsgrad der Projekte war in unterschiedlichem Maße möglich die Beispiele auszuwerten. Im Kapitel 4 werden die wichtigsten Ergebnisse zusammengefasst.  
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GTZ Position (Subsidies….A Think Piece; Fuel Price Index; Access for All – Illusions and Solutions; REN21 etc.): More transparency of costs and prices is a precondition for discussion and participation. Finally, this can lead to a reduction of subsidies. This is the reason why the benefit of transparency is finally bigger for the politics, despite there may be lobbies that have an interest in intransparency.
  
Die komprimierte und schematisierte Form der Darstellung ermöglicht es schnell Projekte zu identifizieren, die spezifische Verbreitungs- und Subventionsstrategien verfolgen und einen ersten Eindruck über die konkrete Ausgestaltung zu erhalten. Weiterhin wird versucht, jeweils die konkreten Finanz- und Subventionsflüsse anhand eines Beispiel SHS zu veranschaulichen und damit zwischen den verschiedenen Ansätzen vergleichbar zu machen.  
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In Germany the financial support was put in a new order with the 20th report on subsidies (2003). This report corresponds to the EU-Energiesteuerrichtlinie (RiLi 2003/96/EG), which shall achieve more transparency.<
  
Jedoch begrenzt die knappe Darstellungsform stark den Rahmen einer für jeden Einzelfall spezifischen Darstellung und Diskussion besonderer lokaler Rahmenbedingungen und Einflussfaktoren, die im gegebenen Projekt zur Wahl der dargestellten Verbreitungs- und Subventionsstrategie geführt haben. Die Vorliegende Darstellung stellt damit keinesfalls eine abschließende Bewertung der dargestellten Projekte dar, sondern versucht vielmehr Grundlage und Anstoß für ein aktives Nachfragen und eine lebhafte Diskussion unter den EnDev Projektleitern zu sein.<br>
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For further information please refer to: '''<span lang="EN-GB" style="font-size: 10pt; font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'">GSI/UNEP, April 2010: [http://www.globalsubsidies.org/files/assets/transparency_ffs.pdf Gaining Traction: The importance of transparency in accelerating the reform of fossil-fuel subsidies]</span>'''
  
== Verbreitung und Subvention von SHS  ==
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<br/>
  
&nbsp;Für die Verbreitung von SHS zur ländlichen Elektrifizierung in dünn besiedelten strukturschwachen Regionen müssen viele Hürden überwunden werden. Grundsätzlich lassen sich dabei die folgenden Bereiche identifizieren die für eine erfolgreiche Verbreitung von SHS berücksichtigt werden müssen:  
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<u>Transparency can influence reform in at least four ways (Hale, 2008):</u>
  
1. Policy: Regierungspolitik, Zölle und Steuern, Standards und Zertifizierung.
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1. by institutionalizing public discourse: the act of disclosure starts a dialogue between the discloser and interested parties;
  
2. Technology: Technologiekosten, technische Qualifizierung des Personals.
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2. by compelling actors to tell the truth, making it difficult for discourse to be manipulated by one “loud,” deceitful actor;
  
3. Marketing: Aufbau einer ländlichen (after-sale-) Service Infrastruktur, unternehmerische Qualifizierung des Personals.
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3. by cutting through the flood of information and often contradictory claims to focus attention on facts;
  
4. Finance: Zugänglichkeit von bezahlbaren Kleinkrediten, Refinanzierungs-kredite für Unternehmen und Mikrokreditinstitutionen (MFI).
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and
  
5. Awareness: Bekanntheit der Technologie, Vertrauen in Produkt und Service, Statuswert der Technology (‚König im Dorf’ oder ‚arme Leute Elektrifizierung’).  
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4. by promoting self-reflection within the organization or government, compelling actors to comply with their own standards and norms.
  
Alle fünf Bereiche sind für ein erfolgreiches SHS Programm wichtig und werden in den später diskutierten Beispielen unterschiedlich adressiert. Die größte Hürde aus der ökonomischer Perspektive stellt dabei die hohe Anfangsinvestition für SHS dar, sowie die Kosten für den langfristigen Betrieb und Ersatz von SHS Komponenten (insbesondere der Batterie). Dem gegenüber stehen eine niedrige Kaufkraft und geringe Ersparnisse auf der Seite der Zielgruppe. Dieser Hürde kann durch eine Anpassung der Finanzierung (Mikrokredite), der Produkte (kleine SHS), der Dienstleistung (Mietsysteme) und einer dem Bedarf angepasste Form von Subventionierung begegnet werden.<br>Abbildung 1: Verschieden Typen von Verbreitungsmodellen für SHS<br>
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<br/>
  
[[Image:Subv.jpg]]  
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In considering the extent to which improving transparency could assist reform, the key consideration appears to be one of ensuring its relevance. For transparency to be useful, information users and providers must desire disclosure of the information and see how such transparency can help meet their objectives. Improved information about fossil-fuel subsidies, in particular, can help governments meet their reform objectives. At the simplest level, information about the subsidy and its effects facilitates an assessment of its costs and benefits and, therefore, of the implications of reform. Making this information publicly available increases awareness of the effects of existing policies and allows public input to decision-making (Wolfe and Helmer, 2007). Many governments understand the economic, social and environmental problems created by subsidies, but are under political pressure to maintain them. Transparency can expose those winners and losers created by subsidies and therefore help to broaden support for reform (Victor, 2009).... Read more: [http://www.globalsubsidies.org/files/assets/transparency_ffs.pdf http://www.globalsubsidies.org/files/assets/transparency_ffs.pdf]
  
<br>
+
'''<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'">Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) - "The Effects of Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Reform: A review of modelling and empirical studies"</span>'''<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'"></span>
  
Grundsätzlich wird bei der Verbreitung von SHS zwischen verkaufsorientierten (sale) und dienstleistungsorientierten (service) Modellen unterschieden (vgl. Abbildung 1). Hauptunterscheidungskriterium ist hier die Frage des Eigentümers, bzw. wer für Wartung und Betrieb verantwortlich ist. Die Trennung ist nicht immer eindeutig, bei manchen Leasing Systemen bleibt der Anbieter Eigentümer des geleasten Systems, während der Nutzer für Wartung und Reparatur selbst verantwortlich ist. Bei einigen Managementverträgen kauft der Nutzer sich ein System, gibt aber die Verantwortung für den langfristigen Betrieb an einen Energiedienstleister ab.  
+
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'">The Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) releases the publication of Jennifer Ellis’ paper “The Effects of Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Reform: A review of modelling and empirical studies.” This is the second paper to be published in the series Untold Billions: Fossil-fuel subsidies, their impacts and the path to reform. Subsidies are powerful instruments and when granted to fossil fuels, which are at the heart of all modern economies, subsidies have impacts throughout the economy, society and environment. Understanding the complex trade-offs between the different impacts of subsidy reform is a challenge for any government considering phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies. In this report, Jennifer Ellis provides a detailed literature review, focusing on the six modeling studies in the last 20 years that have attempted to analyze global impacts of subsidies for all fuels. The studies mostly considered effects on greenhouse gas emissions and gross domestic product, but very little of the work has considered other environmental impacts or social impacts. The paper highlights a number of areas where further research should be undertaken but concludes that there is already enough evidence to demonstrate the significant environmental and economic benefits of phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies, and recommends that policy-makers do not delay in beginning the reform process.</span>
  
Die verschiedenen existierenden Subventionsansätze sind weitgehend unabhängig von den Verbreitungsmodellen und werden deshalb in einem eigenen Kapitel vorgestellt.  
+
'''<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'">Download at</span>'''<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'">: </span><span style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'">[http://www.globalsubsidies.org/en/research/economic-social-and-environmental-effects http://www.globalsubsidies.org/en/research/economic-social-and-environmental-effects]</span>
  
==== Verkaufsorientierte Modelle  ====
+
<br/>
  
Bei verkaufsorientierten Modellen geht das SHS am Ende immer in den Besitz des Nutzers über, der damit auch die Verantwortung für Wartung und Betrieb übernimmt. Es existieren verschiedene verkaufsorientierte Modelle, die einfachste Form, der so genannte ‚Of the shelf’ Verkauf ohne Installation und Wartung wird hier nicht extra erwähnt, da er kein nachhaltiges Verbreitungsmodell darstellt. Als Verkaufsmodelle kommen zum Einsatz:  
+
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'">'''EARTH TRACK: EIA Energy Subsidy Estimates: A Review of Assumptions and Omissions'''</span>
  
1. Barbezahlung oder dealer credit: sofortige Bezahlung oder kurzfristiger (teurer) Kredit, meistens für nicht mehr als 6 Monate und 50% der Kosten. Der Kredit wird meist in einer Zahlung zurückgezahlt (oft nach der nächsten Ernte). Durch die hohen Kosten von SHS und häufig ungenügenden after-sale-service erreicht dieses Modell selten arme Bevölkerungsgruppen in abgelegenen Gebieten.  
+
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'">This Review provides a detailed look at gaps in federal tracking of energy subsidies in the United States. In addition to evaluating the research approach used by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the Review assesses how key assumptions and omissions in EIA's work resulted in a substantial undercounting of federal energy subsidies and an inaccurate portrayal of subsidy distribution across fuels. EIA estimates are also placed in the context of other assessments of domestic energy subsidies conducted over the past thirty years.</span>
  
2. One-hand-model: Kredit vermittelter Verkauf oder (hire-purchase) Leasing. Das Solar Home System geht direkt oder schrittweise in das Eigentum des Käufers über (meist in Verbindung einer ersten Rate von 10-15% des Kaufpreises), der damit in der Regel die volle Verantwortung für Betrieb und Wartung übernimmt. Der Kreditgeber und Installateur sind die gleiche Institution, das SHS dient als Sicherheit. Der Kredit wird in monatlichen Raten über 2-3 Jahre rückgezahlt.
+
'''Read more: '''[http://bit.ly/1t6iTiB EIA Energy Subsidy Estimates: A Review of Assumptions and Omissions]
  
3. Two-hand-model: Kredit vermittelter Verkauf oder (hire-purchase) Leasing. Im unterschied zum one-hand-model sind Kreditgeber und Installateur unterschiedliche Unternehmen. Größere Flexibilität der Anbieter, aber doppelter Servicestrukturaufwand. Starke Abhängigkeit des Kreditgebers von der Qualität des Installateurs.
+
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'"></span>
  
4. Leasing Systeme: der Nutzer mietet das SHS nur für einen bestimmten Zeitraum, ist aber selber für Wartung und Betrieb verantwortlich (typisches Beispiel wäre ein 2 Jahre Leasingvertrag für ein Auto in Deutschland), findet aber in der Praxis kaum Anwendung.  
+
<span lang="EN-US" style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'">'''IMF Note - Petroleum Product Subsidies: Costly, Inequitable, and Rising''' Petroleum product subsidies have again started to rise with the rebound in international prices. This note reviews recent developments in subsidy levels and argues that it is necessary to reform the policy framework for setting petroleum product prices in order to reduce the fiscal burden of these subsidies and to address climate change. In 2003, global consumer subsidies for petroleum products totaled nearly $60 billion. '''Read more:''' </span><span style="font-family: 'arial','sans-serif'">[http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spn1005.pdf Petroleum Product Subsidies: Costly, Inequitable, and Rising]</span>
  
Typisches Beispiel für ein one-hand-model ist das Programm REREDP in Bangladesh (siehe Kap 3.3 und 3.4). Partnerorganisationen wie z.B. Grameen Shakti nutzen hier ein hire-purchase Leasingsystem bei dem die MFI selber die SHS verkauft und wartet. Ein vergleichbares two-hand-model verwendet das Programm RERED in Sri Lanka (vgl. Kap. 3.11).
+
<br/>
  
Verkaufsmodelle können auch eine stärkere Servicekomponente beinhalten wie z.B. im Falle von Grameen Shakti, wo ein monatlicher Wartungsbesuch für den Zeitraum der Ratenzahlung eingeschlossen ist. Dieser Wartungsservice kann gegen geringe Gebühr auch dauerhaft fortgeführt werden und abbezahlte SHS können beim Kauf eines größeren SHS an Grameen Shakti zurück verkauft werden.
+
= Subsidies for Solar Home System Promotion =
  
Das laotischen Unternehmen Sunlabob (vgl. Kap. 3.10) bietet darüber hinaus einen Managementvertrag für von Sunlabob erworbene SHS an, der für eine regelmäßige Gebühr die langfristige Verfügbarkeit des SHS garantiert und auch den Austausch von Komponenten nach Ende der Lebensdauer abdeckt. Diese Art des Managementvertrages stellt damit eine Zwischenform zwischen Verkaufs- und Service orientierten Modellen dar, der einzige Unterschied zu fee-for-service Systemen ist, dass die Anfangsinvestition in das SHS vorab geleistet werden muss und damit die späteren Managementgebühren niedriger als bei einem reinen fee-for-service System ausfallen.<br>
+
So far all [[Solar Home Systems (SHS)|SHS]] programmes have relied on subsidies of one sort or another. In doing so it is often argued that market imperfections (e.g. lack of private financial institutions in rural areas, lacking information on available SHS options) justify the subsidisation of SHS or related activities. The challenging task is then how to target and allocate those corrective subsidies. This is a difficult question because what is deemed a market imperfection may well be economic barriers or transaction costs correctly priced by the market. For instance, is it a market imperfection that small amounts of money are more costly to lend than large amounts, or that lending against a steady stream of income is less risky than a loan given to a household with irregular or no income? Probably not. One could still make a case for special support measures that redress social or economic imbalances, but the case would rest on other arguments than that of imperfect or distorted markets.
  
==== Dienstleistungsorientierte Modelle  ====
+
Hence, the core of the discussion on subsidies boils down to the question whether SHS serve economic development or other public policy objectives. If this question is answered in the affirmative, the alleged violations of free market principles often criticised by opponents of subsidisation appear in a different light. However, the claim of contributing to the achievement of general welfare objectives has important impacts on the design of projects: SHS projects should be designed as but one component of a larger programme aiming at a variety of development objectives like power sector reform, rural electrification, and rural development.
  
Bei dienstleistungsorientierten Modellen verbleibt das SHS immer im Besitz einer Betreibergesellschaft, die nur die Energiedienstleistung an den Endkunden verkauft und dafür eine z.B. monatliche Servicegebühr kassiert. So genannte ‚fee-for-service’ Systeme können auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen zum Einsatz kommen:
+
There are direct and indirect subsidies to be found in all projects supported governmentally and internationally, and at all levels. Subsidies are quite often undisclosed, and therefore not transparent enough to be clearly recognised as such by those who would benefit, and those who have the political authority to decide in favour. This leads to SHS financing programmes that are not able to fulfil the standards of finance sector conformity and long-term sustainability. In the partly controversial discussion going on about subsidies, the view that SHS can be propagated with the help of subsidies, as long as they are transparent, serve public interest and do not distort the market, seems to be gaining ground.
  
1. Im Rahmen von staatlichen subventionierten Konzessionen die öffentlich ausgeschrieben und von bestehenden EVUs oder neuen Energiedienstleistern (ESCOs) ausgeführt werden (z.B. Südafrika und Senegal).
+
Possible direct subsidies for solar systems:
  
2. Vereinzelt gibt es auch unregulierte privatwirtschaftliche Ansätze für fee-for-service Systeme in lokal begrenzten Gebieten, die aber ebenso durch Subventionen gefördert werden (Soluz Honduras, Sunlabob Laos).  
+
*Direct price subsidies of systems that meet minimum specs and or providers who guarantee local hubs for replacements and repair.
 +
*Direct subsidies to compensate quality investments, warranty and recycling
 +
*Tax reductions
 +
*Support to MFI for consumer credits
 +
*Import of Containers and commissioning to local retailers(thus implicitly subsidizing risk premium, import unit prices and pre-financing costs).
 +
*Provide Coupons to qualified technicians against, which they can buy qualified systems.
  
3. Des Weiteren existieren Ansätze von lokalen genossenschaftlichen oder NGO basierten Systemen (z.B. Stiftung Solarenergie in Äthiopien) die aber ebenso abhängig von Subventionen bleiben.
+
Possible indirect subsidies:
  
4. Service Managementvertrag, der die dauerhafte Verfügbarkeit des Systems garantiert.
+
*Teaser & Road Shows
 +
*Skills development for technicians, retailers
 +
*Support local assembly through technology transfer measures
  
Fee-for-service Systeme haben den Vorteil, dass sie den Nutzer von den Investitionskosten und der langfristigen Organisation von Wartung und Betrieb befreien. Der Kunde bekommt direkt, was er eigentlich braucht, nämlich die reine Energiedienstleistung in Form von Strom für Beleuchtung, Radio, TV etc. In der Realität gestaltet sich die Umsetzung von fee-for-service Systemen aber erheblich schwieriger als der einfache Verkauf, denn der Aufbau einer Service Infrastruktur in ländlichen Gebieten ist kompliziert und teuer. Auch wenn dieses Argument genauso für den after sale service gilt, stellt sich die Beziehung zwischen fee-for-service Anbietern und Kunden als wesentlich stärker verflochten dar.  
+
<br/><u>Source</u>: [[:File:Financing of Solar Home Systems in Developing Countries.pdf|GTZ: FINANCING OF SOLAR HOME SYSTEMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, THE ROLE OF FINANCING IN THE DISSEMINATION PROCESS, Volume I: Main Report, Updated edition 2001, Eschborn, March 2001.]]
  
Auf der einen Seite muss für den Anbieter die regelmäßige Einnahme von Gebühren gewährleistet sein. Durch die geringe Höhe der monatlichen Gebühren kommt es zu hohen Transaktionskosten die z.B. durch pre-payment Systeme gesenkt werden können. Der Anbieter muss die Möglichkeit haben zeitnah und kostengünstig auf Zahlungsunterlassungen reagieren zu können, weil sonst der Aufwand für wiederholten Auf- und Abbau von SHS in keiner Relation zu den verlorenen Gebühreneinahmen steht. Eine innovative Lösung für dieses Dilemma wird im Beispiel des Projektes der Stiftung Solarenergie in Äthiopien (Kap. 3.9) vorgestellt.
+
<br/>
  
Auf der anderen Seite muss die Verfügbarkeit des SHS für den Kunden gewährleistet werden und das in Regionen, in denen es oft keine Mobilfunknetze gibt. Aber auch wenn der Kunde den Anbieter zeitnah über Störungen informieren kann, ist nicht automatisch gewährleistet, dass der Anbieter schnell reagiert. Gerade im Kontext monopolistischer Konzessionsgebiete, in denen Kunden keine Alternative zu einem Anbieter haben wird oft kritisiert, dass die Reaktionszeit bei Störungen zu groß ist.
+
== Approaches ==
  
Eine andere Grenze bei fee-for-service Systemen ist die Systemgröße selbst: kleine SHS können schnell abgebaut und abtransportiert werden. Bei größeren Installationen gestaltet sich das wesentlich komplizierter. Sunlabob als fee-for-service anbietendes Unternehmen hat hierfür ein eigenes Modell entwickelt, wie in Rahmen einer PPP die festen Installationen (z.B. bei Wasserkraft Dämme, Rohre und Maschinenhaus) von dem Kunden gebaut oder gekauft werden, während das Equipment (Wasserturbine, Generatoren etc.) von Sunlabob eingebracht werden. Der generierte Strom wird wiederum an den Kunden Verkauft und die Verfügbarkeit durch Sunlabob garantiert (vgl. Kap. 3.10).<br>
+
A variety of approaches and strategies of direct and indirect subsidies for SHS are used at different levels:
  
==== Ansätze für die Subventionierung von SHS  ====
+
'''1. Buy down grant''': direct (sub-)subsidy for the primary system, reaches the end-user mostly indirectly through the dealer or a microfinance institution (MFI). In case of a service based approach, buy down grant and start-up subsidy are mixed (see below).
  
Es existiert eine Vielzahl von Ansätzen und Strategien zur Subventionierung von SHS, die auf verschieden Ebenen direkt oder indirekt zum Einsatz kommen:
+
'''2. Start-up subsidy''': a start-up financing for the set-up of a new company, launching new products and new services or the establishment of a rural sales and / or service system in new regions.
  
1. Buy down grant: die direkte (Teil-)Subvention der Primärsysteme die meistens indirekt über den Händler oder die Mikrofinanzinstitution (MFI) an den Endkunden fliest, im Falle von Dienstleistungssystemen vermischen sich hier buy down grant und start up subsidy (s.u.).  
+
'''3. Refinancing''': granting of long-term reduced interest loans for the initial investment (service model) or financing of SHS (sales model).
  
2. Start up subsidy: eine Anschubsfinanzierung für den Aufbau eines neuen Unternehmens, die Einführung neuer Produkte und Servicebereiche oder die Etablierung eines ländlichen Verkaufs- und/oder Servicesystems in neuen Regionen.  
+
'''4. Tax and customs reduction or exemption '''for SHS components, installation and service.
  
3. Refinancing: die Gewährung langfristiger zinsvergünstigter Kredite für die Startinvestition (service model) oder Finanzierung von SHS (sale model).  
+
'''5. Formation and training '''for the start-up of a new company, launching new products and services or the establishment of a rural sales and / or service system in new regions.
  
4. Steuer- und Zollerleichterung oder -befreiung für SHS Komponenten, Installation und Service.  
+
'''6. Development and dissemination of standards and quality labels '''and contemporaneous support of actors (companies, MFIs, NGOs, CBOs) in the introduction and application of standards and labels.
  
5. Ausbildung und Trainingsmaßnahmen für den Aufbau eines neuen Unternehmens, die Einführung neuer Produkte und Servicebereiche oder die Etablierung eines ländlichen Verkaufs- und/oder Servicesystems in neuen Regionen.  
+
'''7.''' In case of service-oriented models, '''permanent cross-subsidisation '''of decentralised energy services with revenues from the central electricity sale or taxes.
  
6. Entwicklung und Verbreitung von Standards und Qualitätssiegeln bei gleichzeitiger Unterstützung der Akteure (Unternehmen, MFIs, NGOs, CBOs) bei der Einführung und Anwendung der Standards und Siegel.  
+
In reality, various strategies are often combined.
  
7. Im Falle von Dienstleistungsorientierten Modellen die dauerhafte Quersubventionierung der dezentralen Energiedienstleistung mit Einnahmen aus dem zentralen Stromverkauf oder mit Steuergeldern.  
+
<u>Source</u>: Study done by [http://www.sinergi.de/ SiNERGi] for EnDev
  
In der Realität kommt es häufig zu einer Verknüpfung verschiedener Förderstrategien.<br>
+
<br/>
  
==== Übersicht der betrachteten Praxisbeispiele  ====
+
== SHS Dissemination and Subsidies within different Projects ==
  
In der folgenden Tabelle wird sortiert nach Verbreitungs- und Subventionsmodell ein Überblick über die in Kapitel 3 dargestellten Länderprojekte gegeben.
+
{| border="2" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="0" style="width: 90%;"
 
 
'''Tabelle 1: SHS Verbreitungs- und Subventionsmodelle'''
 
 
 
{| cellspacing="0" cellpadding="2" width="791" border="2"
 
 
|-
 
|-
| align="center" bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''Verkaufsmodell'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ffff99" style="text-align: center;" | '''Sales Models'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ffff99" | &nbsp;
+
| bgcolor="#ffff99" style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" bgcolor="#ffff99" colspan="7" | '''Subventionstypen'''
+
| colspan="7" bgcolor="#ffff99" style="text-align: center;" | '''Subsidies'''
 
|-
 
|-
| align="center" bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''Typ'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ffff99" style="text-align: center;" | '''Type'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''Länder- und Projektbeispiele'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ffff99" style="text-align: center;" | '''Country and Project Examples'''
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''1. Buy down grant'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''1. Buy down grant'''
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''2. Start up subsidy'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''2. Start up subsidy'''
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''3. Refinan-zierung'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''3. Refi-nancing'''
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''4. Steuer- / Zollfreiheit'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''4. Tax/ Customs Exemption'''
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''5. Ausbildung/ Training'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''5. Formation/ Training'''
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''6. Standards, Qualitätss.'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''6. Standards, Quality Label'''
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''7. Quer-subventionen'''
+
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''7. Cross-subsidisation'''
 
|-
 
|-
| bgcolor="#ffff99" rowspan="3" | '''1. Barbezahlung oder <br>dealer credit'''  
+
| rowspan="3" bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''1. Cash sales or<br/>dealer credit'''
| '''EnDev Nicaragua (S. 9)'''  
+
| '''EnDev Nicaragua'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
 
|-
 
|-
| '''EnDev Uganda (S. 21)'''  
+
| '''EnDev Uganda'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
 
|-
 
|-
| '''GTZ Tansania (S. 27)'''  
+
| '''GTZ Tansania'''
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
 
|-
 
|-
| bgcolor="#ffff99" rowspan="2" | '''2. ‚One hand model<nowiki>’</nowiki> Kredit und Service aus einer Hand'''  
+
| rowspan="2" bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''2. ‚One hand model<br/>Credit and service from one source'''
| '''EnDev Bangladesh I (S. 15)'''  
+
| '''EnDev Bangladesh I'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
 
|-
 
|-
| '''EnDev Bangladesh II (S. 18)'''  
+
| '''EnDev Bangladesh II'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
 
|-
 
|-
| bgcolor="#ffff99" rowspan="2" | '''3. ‚Two hand model<nowiki>’</nowiki> Kredit und Service getrennt'''  
+
| rowspan="2" bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''3. ‚Two hand model<br/>Credit and service separated'''
| '''EnDev Honduras (S. 12)'''  
+
| '''EnDev Honduras'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
 
|-
 
|-
| '''Sri Lanka RERED (S. 39)'''  
+
| '''Sri Lanka RERED'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" style="text-align: center;" | '''X'''
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
 
|-
 
|-
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''4. Leasingvertrag <br>(ohne Service)'''
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| '''--'''
+
|  
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| style="text-align: center;" |  
 
|-
 
|-
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| bgcolor="#ccffff" style="text-align: center;" | '''Fee for Service Models'''
| &nbsp;
+
| bgcolor="#ccffff" |  
| align="center" | &nbsp;
+
| colspan="7" bgcolor="#ccffff" style="text-align: center;" | '''Subsidies'''
| align="center" | &nbsp;
 
| align="center" | &nbsp;
 
| align="center" | &nbsp;
 
| align="center" | &nbsp;
 
| align="center" | &nbsp;  
 
| align="center" | &nbsp;
 
 
|-
 
|-
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''Dienstleistungsmodell'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffff" style="text-align: center;" | '''Type'''
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | &nbsp;
+
| bgcolor="#ccffff" style="text-align: center;" | '''Country and Project Examples'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffff" colspan="7" | '''Subventionstypen'''
+
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''1. Buy down grant'''
 +
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''2. Start up subsidy'''
 +
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''3. Refi-nancing'''
 +
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''4.Tax/ Customs'''<br/>'''Exemption'''
 +
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''5. Formation/ Training'''
 +
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''6. Standards, Quality Label'''
 +
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''7. Cross-<br/>subsidisation'''
 
|-
 
|-
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''Typ'''  
+
| rowspan="2" bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''1. Concession based regulated service EVU or RESCO'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''Länder- und Projektbeispiele'''  
+
| '''EnDev Senegal'''
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''1. Buy down grant'''
+
|  
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''2. Start up subsidy'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''3. Refinanzierung'''
+
|  
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''4. Steuer- / Zollfreiheit'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''5. Ausbildung/ Training'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''6. Standards, Qualitätss.'''
+
|  
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''7. Quersubventionen'''
+
|  
 
|-
 
|-
| bgcolor="#ccffff" rowspan="2" | '''1. Konzessionsgeregelter Service EVU oder RESCO'''  
+
| '''GTZ Pakistan'''
| '''EnDev Senegal (S. 24)'''  
+
|
| &nbsp;
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
|
| &nbsp;
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
| &nbsp;
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
| &nbsp;
 
 
|-
 
|-
| '''GTZ Pakistan (S. 30)'''
+
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''2. Non regulated<br/>service through RESCOs'''
| &nbsp;
+
| '''Sunlabob Laos'''
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
+
|  
| &nbsp;
 
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
 
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
 
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
 
 
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
 
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
 +
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
 +
| '''?'''
 +
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
 +
| '''?'''
 +
|
 
|-
 
|-
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''2. Unregulierter Service durch RESCOs'''
+
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''3. Service through local NGO or cooperative'''
| '''Sunlabob Laos (S. 36)'''
+
| '''Solarstiftung Äthiopien'''
| &nbsp;
+
|  
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
+
|  
| '''?'''
+
|  
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
| '''?'''
+
|  
| &nbsp;
 
|-
 
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''3. Service durch lokale NGO oder Genossenschaft'''  
 
| '''Solarstiftung Äthiopien (S. 33)'''  
 
| &nbsp;
 
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
 
| &nbsp;
 
| &nbsp;
 
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
 
| &nbsp;
 
 
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''?'''
 
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''?'''
 
|-
 
|-
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''4. Managementvertrag mit RESCO'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''4. Management contract with RESCO'''
| '''Sunlabob Laos (S. 36)'''  
+
| '''Sunlabob Laos'''
| &nbsp;
+
|  
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
| &nbsp;
+
|  
| '''?'''  
+
| '''?'''
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''  
+
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''X'''
| '''?'''  
+
| '''?'''
| &nbsp;
+
|  
 
|}
 
|}
  
== Länderbeispiele  ==
+
<br/>
  
==== [[Subsidies for SHS Nicaragua|EnDev Nicaragua]]  ====
+
As the tables show the sales models prevail; subsidy rates range between 0% and 60&nbsp;%. The target group and the availability of affordable loans for the target group are obviously critical drivers, besides the size of the system.<br/>Fee for service models have higher subsidy rates (70-100%). This may be caused by:
  
==== [[Subsidies for SHS Honduras|EnDev Honduras]]  ====
+
1. aiming for a high market penetration (Poor and dispersed households are more involved, than in the sales models)<br/>2. establishing and substituting a aftersale service.
  
==== [[Subsidies for SHS Bangladesh I|Endev Bangladesh I]]  ====
+
<br/>
  
==== [[Subsidies for SHS Bangladesh II|Endev Bangladesh II]]  ====
+
Besides direct subsidies (buy down grant, start up subsidies), a lot of projects use indirect subsidies, too:
  
==== [[Subsidies for SHS Uganda|Endev Uganda]]  ====
+
• All projects foster training and qualification (except Bangladesh, because this was already done by the World bank- project<br/>• In most of the project-countries SHS are free of purchase tax and tolls<br/>• Some projects offer low interest refunding for local MFIs and RESCOs. To lower the transaction costs, the smaller projects in Tanzania and Honduras offer allowances to setup capital for the further dissemination of SHS instead of credits.<br/>• Quality standards and certifications are only used within the big programmes of the world bank. Their implementation is obviously too expensive for smaller, short-term projects. But it may be possible that the projects in Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda will take over this approach in the long run.
  
==== [[Subsidies for SHS Senegal|Endev Senegal]]  ====
+
<u>Source:</u> SiNERGi study
  
==== [[Subsidies for SHS Tansania|GTZ Tansania]]  ====
+
<br/>
  
==== [[Subsidies for SHS Pakistan|Roshan Pakistan]]  ====
+
== Summary SHS Subsidies ==
  
==== [[Subsidies for SHS Ethiopia|Äthiopien – Licht für Bildung II]]  ====
+
The various existing subsidy approaches are independent of the diffusion models; this can be divided in sales oriented or service oriented models
  
==== [[Subsidies for SHS Laos|Laos Sunlabob]]  ====
+
Sales-oriented models:<br/>The SHS will end up getting into the hands of the user; he will also assume the responsibility for maintenance and operation.
  
==== [[Subsidies for SHS Sri Lanka|Sri Lanka RERED]]  ====
+
'''1. Cash payment''': immediate payment or short-term (more expensive) credit, mostly for not more than 6 months and 50% of the cost Due to the high cost of SHS and often inadequate after-sale service of this model rarely reaches poor communities in remote areas.
  
== Zusammenfassung  ==
+
'''2. One-hand model''': Hire-purchase leasing. The SHS is directly in the property of the purchaser, who will therefore normally take full responsibility for operation and maintenance. The credit institution and installer are the same institution, the SHS serves as collateral. The loan is repaid in monthly installments over 2-3 years.
  
Wie bereits in der Einleitung erwähnt, können die hier vorgestellten Beispiele nicht allein auf Basis der Finanz- und Subventionsanteile ausreichend beschrieben werden. Trotzdem soll in der folgenden Tabelle ein Überblick über Verbreitungskosten, Endkundenpreise und Subventionsanteile gegeben werden.  
+
'''3. Two-hand model''': Hire-purchase leasing. The difference with the one-hand-model is that the credit institution and installer are different companies, this gives greater flexibility of the provider, but twice the cost structure of service).<br/>'''4. Leasing systems''': the user rents the SHS only for a certain period, and he is also responsible for maintenance and operation, but this is rarely used in practice.
  
'''Tabelle 2: Kosten und Subventionsvergleich'''
+
<br/>
  
{| cellspacing="0" cellpadding="4" width="90%" border="2"
+
In the next table an overview of distribution costs, retail prices and subsidy shares are given.<br/>'''Table: Cost and subsidy comparison'''
 +
 
 +
{| border="2" cellpadding="4" cellspacing="0" style="width: 90%;"
 
|-
 
|-
| bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''Länderbeispiel'''  
+
| '''Country'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''Modell'''  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | '''Model'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''Verbreitungskosten in € pro SHS'''  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | '''<font style="background-color: #ffffff">Dissemination cost in € per SHS</font>'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''Preis für den Kunden in €'''  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | '''<font style="background-color: #ffffff">Cost for the user in €</font>'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffcc" | '''Anteil direkter Subventionen'''<sup>'''1'''</sup>
+
| style="text-align: center;" | '''Percentage of the direct subsidy1'''
 
|-
 
|-
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''EnDev Nicaragua'''  
+
| '''EnDev Nicaragua'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ffff99" | Barzahlung
+
| style="text-align: center;" | Cash
| align="center" | 600 (75-85 Wp)  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 600 (75-85 Wp)
| align="center" | 220-280  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 220-280
| align="center" | 54-63%
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 54-63%
 
|-
 
|-
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''EnDev Honduras'''  
+
| '''EnDev Honduras'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ffff99" | Two hand  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | Two hand
| align="center" | 576 (54 Wp)  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 576 (54 Wp)
| align="center" | 231-301  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 231-301
| align="center" | 60%
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 60%
 
|-
 
|-
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''EnDev Bangladesh'''  
+
| '''EnDev Bangladesh'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ffff99" | One hand  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | One hand
| align="center" | 341 (50 Wp)  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 341 (50 Wp)
| align="center" | 290  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 290
| align="center" | 15%
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 15%
 
|-
 
|-
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''EnDev Bangladesh II'''  
+
| '''EnDev Bangladesh II'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ffff99" | One hand  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | One hand
| align="center" | 142-149 (21 Wp)  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 142-149 (21 Wp)
| align="center" | 98-115  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 98-115
| align="center" | 19-34%
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 19-34%
 
|-
 
|-
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''EnDev Uganda'''  
+
| '''EnDev Uganda'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ffff99" | Barzahlung
+
| style="text-align: center;" | Cash
| align="center" | 420 (50 Wp)  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 420 (50 Wp)
| align="center" | 420  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 420
| align="center" | 0%<sup>2</sup>
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 0%<sup>2</sup>
 
|-
 
|-
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''EnDev Senegal'''  
+
| '''EnDev Senegal'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffff" | Konzession
+
| style="text-align: center;" | Concesion
| align="center" | 498 (50 Wp)  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 498 (50 Wp)
| align="center" | 30 Anschluss, <br>6 pro Monat  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 30 Anschluss, <span></span>
| align="center" | 70%
+
<span>6 pro Monat</span>
 +
 
 +
| style="text-align: center;" | 70%
 
|-
 
|-
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''GTZ Tansania'''  
+
| '''GTZ Tansania'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ffff99" | Barzahlung
+
| style="text-align: center;" | Cash
| align="center" | 200 (14 Wp)  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 200 (14 Wp)
| align="center" | 200  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 200
| align="center" | 0%
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 0%
 
|-
 
|-
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''Roshan Pakistan'''  
+
| '''Roshan Pakistan'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffff" | Konzession
+
| style="text-align: center;" | Concesion
| align="center" | &nbsp;?? (40 Wp)  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | &nbsp;?? (40 Wp)
| align="center" | 4,10 Anschluss, 1,76 pro Monat  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 4,10 Anschluss, 1,76 pro Monat
| align="center" | 100%
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 100%
 
|-
 
|-
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''Solarstiftung Äthiopien'''  
+
| '''Solar donation Ethiopia'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffff" | Service NGO  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | Service NGO
| align="center" | 200 (10 Wp)  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 200 (10 Wp)
| align="center" | Anschluss frei, 0,17 pro Monat  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | Anschluss frei, 0,17 pro Monat
| align="center" | 100%
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 100%
 
|-
 
|-
| bgcolor="#ccffff" | '''Sunlabob Laos'''  
+
| '''Sunlabob Laos'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ccffff" | Service RESCO  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | Service RESCO
| align="center" | &nbsp;?? (20 Wp)  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | &nbsp;?? (20 Wp)
| align="center" | &nbsp;?? Anschluss, 2,5 pro Monat  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | &nbsp;?? Anschluss, 2,5 pro Monat
| align="center" | 0%<sup>3</sup>
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 0%<sup>3</sup>
 
|-
 
|-
| bgcolor="#ffff99" | '''Sri Lanka RERED'''  
+
| '''Sri Lanka RERED'''
| align="center" bgcolor="#ffff99" | Two hand  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | Two hand
| align="center" | 372-437 (?30? Wp)  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 372-437 (?30? Wp)
| align="center" | 310-375  
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 310-375
| align="center" | 14-17%
+
| style="text-align: center;" | 14-17%
 
|}
 
|}
  
1: an direkten Kosten für System und Installation, ohne O&amp;M.<br>2: für Privatkunden, für soziale Institutionen werden bis zu 85&nbsp;% der Kosten subventioniert.<br>3: aber vergünstigte Refinanzierungskredite
+
''1: Direct cost of the system and the installation without O&M.<br/>2: For private costumer, for social institutions will be up to 85% of the cost subsidized.<br/>3: But preferential refinance credits''
 +
 
 +
<br/>For an evaluation of this economical data, more information about the quality and sustainability of the SHS as well as O&M should be collected. In addition to the question, how far could the target group of rural poor population in the various examples be achieved?
 +
 
 +
<br/>Nevertheless, some preliminary conclusions can be done:<br/>• Credit systems, whether one-or two-hand models, for their success need a small increase in the amount of subsidy.<br/>• Fee for service systems, in comparison to sales systems, need to be stronger subsidised.
 +
 
 +
<br/>
 +
 
 +
Source: SiNERGi study
 +
 
 +
<br/>
 +
 
 +
= Subsidies for Improved Cookstoves =
  
Für eine Bewertung dieser ökonomischen Daten müssen Informationen zu Qualität und Nachhaltigkeit der SHS, sowie von O&amp;M und Dienstleistungen erhoben werden. Darüber hinaus zu klären ist die Frage, in wie weit die Zielgruppe der ärmeren ländlichen Bevölkerung in den verschiedenen Beispielen erreicht werden konnte.
+
[[Financing Mechanisms for Cookstove Dissemination#Purchasing Improved Cookstoves Through Subsidies|► Read more here]]
  
Trotzdem lassen sich einige erste Schlüsse ziehen:
+
<br/>
  
*Kreditsysteme, egal ob One- oder Two-hand-models benötigen für den Erfolg offensichtlich eine wesentlich geringere Höhe von Subventionen.
+
= Further Information =
*Fee for service Systeme werden im Vergleich zu Verkaufssystemen noch stärker subventioniert, der Fall von Sunlabob, wo Mietsysteme einzig gfördert durch günstige Refinanzierungskredite ermöglicht werden, sollte genauer untersucht werden.
 
  
<br>[[Solar Main Page|⇒ Back to Solar Section]]  
+
#'''New study on energy access subsidies conducted by EnDev and SV PPI available.''' [http://www.giz.de/expertise/downloads/gtz2009-en-energy-subsidies-a-think-piece.pdf Energy Subsidies: Why, When and How?]
 +
#Energypedia-article about [[Financing Models for Solar Home Systems|Financing Models for Solar Home Systems]]
 +
#Mirco Gaul's (SiNERGi) study on <font color="#002bb8">''Subsidy schemes for the dissemination of improved stoves''</font>gives a brief overview of the current state of approaches and strategies for the promotion of improved stoves as implemented by EnDev projects in Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Mali
 +
#paper by Kenneth P. Thomas: [http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?pno=1069 Assessing Sustainable Development Impacts of Investment Incentives: A Checklist], IISD, 2009
 +
#ASTAE: Best Practices for Photovoltaic Household Electrification Programs, World Bank, Washington DC, 1996
 +
#Barnes D. F.: Meeting the Challenge of Rural Electrification in Developing Nations: The Experience of Successful Programs, Word Bank, ESMAP, March 2005
 +
#ESMAP: Best Practice Manual: Promoting Decentralized Electrification Investment, October 2001
 +
#Gunaratne L.: Rural Energy Services - Best Practices, USAID / SARI Energy Program, May 2002
 +
#Hankins M., Banks D.: Solar Photovoltaics in Africa, Experiences with Financing and Delivery Models, UNDP-GEF M&E Report Series No 2, New York, May 2004
 +
#IEA PVPS: Summary of Models for the Implementation of Solar Home Systems in Developing Countries, Part 1 and 2, Report IEA PVPS T9-02:2003
 +
#IEA PVPS: Financing Mechanisms for Solar Home Systems in Developing Countries, Report IEA PVPS T9-01:2002
 +
#IEA PVPS: 16 Case Studies on the Deployment of Photovoltaic Technologies in Developing Countries, Report IEA PVPS T9-07:2003
 +
#International Resources Group: Evaluating the Potential for Scale-Up of Off-Grid Renewable Power, World Bank, Washington DC, July 2003
 +
#ISES: Rural Energy Suply models – RESuM, 2001, [http://resum.ises.org/ http://resum.ises.org/]
 +
#Komives K., Foster V. et al.: Water, Electricity, and the Poor: Who Benefits from Utility Subsidies?, World Bank, Washington DC, 2005
 +
#Lindlein P., Mostert W.: Financing Instruments for Renewable Energy, Part of World Bank’s ”Road Map for Scaling up Access to Modern Energy Services and Clean Energy”, World Bank, Washington DC, 2005
 +
#Martinot E. et al: World Bank/GEF solar home system projects: experiences and lessons learned 1993–2001, Renewable and sustainable Energy Reviews 5 (2001) 39-57
 +
#Martinot E., Reiche K.: Regulatory Approaches to Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy: Case Studies from Six Developing Countries, Working Paper, World Bank, Washington DC, June 2000
 +
#Owens G.: Best Practices Guide: Economic & Financial Evaluation of Renewable Energy Projects, USAID 2002
 +
#Reiche K., Covarrubias A., Martinot E.: Expanding Electricity Access to Remote Areas: Off-Grid Rural Electrification in Developing Countries, WorldPower (2000) 52-60
 +
#World Bank Renewable Energy Toolkit: [http://go.worldbank.org/Y20OGSRGH0 http://go.worldbank.org/Y20OGSRGH0]
 +
#[[Examples of Legal Texts and Regulations to Lift Import Duties for PV Products|Examples of Legal Texts and Regulations to Lift Import Duties for PV Products]]<br/>
 +
#[[National_Approaches_to_Electrification_–_Review_of_Options|National Approaches to Electrification - Review of Options]]
  
<br><br>
+
<br/>
  
= Further Reading  =
+
= References =
  
#'''New study&nbsp;on energy access subsidies conducted by EnDev and SV PPI available.''' [http://energypedia.info/extensions/FCKeditor/fckeditor/editor/GTZ%20study <font color="#002bb8">Link to abstract, download and discussion group.</font>]
+
<references /><br/>
#[http://energypedia.info/extensions/FCKeditor/fckeditor/editor/Overview%20Subsidies%20EnDev <font color="#002bb8">EnDev subsidies Overview</font>]
 
#Detailed article on [http://energypedia.info/extensions/FCKeditor/fckeditor/editor/Subsidies%20for%20Solar%20Home%20Systems <font color="#002bb8">Subsidies for Solar Home Systems</font>] in various countries
 
#Mirco Gaul's (SiNERGi) study on [http://www.energypedia.info/index.php/File:Stove_subsidies-gtz-2009.pdf <font color="#002bb8">''Subsidy schemes for the dissemination of improved stoves''</font>]gives a brief overview of the current state of approaches and strategies for the promotion of improved stoves as implemented by EnDev projects in Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Mali
 
#paper by Kenneth P. Thomas: [http://www.iisd.org/publications/pub.aspx?pno=1069 <font color="#002bb8">Assessing Sustainable Development Impacts of Investment Incentives: A Checklist</font>], IISD, 2009
 
#ASTAE: Best Practices for Photovoltaic Household Electrification Programs, World Bank, Washington DC, 1996
 
#Barnes D. F.: Meeting the Challenge of Rural Electrification in Developing Nations: The Experience of Successful Programs, Word Bank, ESMAP, March 2005
 
#ESMAP: Best Practice Manual: Promoting Decentralized Electrification Investment, October 2001
 
#Gunaratne L.: Rural Energy Services - Best Practices, USAID / SARI Energy Program, May 2002
 
#Hankins M., Banks D.: Solar Photovoltaics in Africa, Experiences with Financing and Delivery Models, UNDP-GEF M&amp;E Report Series No 2, New York, May 2004
 
#IEA PVPS: Summary of Models for the Implementation of Solar Home Systems in Developing Countries, Part 1 and 2, Report IEA PVPS T9-02:2003
 
#IEA PVPS: Financing Mechanisms for Solar Home Systems in Developing Countries, Report IEA PVPS T9-01:2002
 
#IEA PVPS: 16 Case Studies on the Deployment of Photovoltaic Technologies in Developing Countries, Report IEA PVPS T9-07:2003
 
#International Resources Group: Evaluating the Potential for Scale-Up of Off-Grid Renewable Power, World Bank, Washington DC, July 2003
 
#ISES: Rural Energy Suply models – RESuM, 2001, [http://resum.ises.org/ <font color="#002bb8">http://resum.ises.org/</font>]
 
#Komives K., Foster V. et al.: Water, Electricity, and the Poor: Who Benefits from Utility Subsidies?, World Bank, Washington DC, 2005
 
#Lindlein P., Mostert W.: Financing Instruments for Renewable Energy, Part of World Bank’s ”Road Map for Scaling up Access to Modern Energy Services and Clean Energy”, World Bank, Washington DC, 2005
 
#Martinot E. et al: World Bank/GEF solar home system projects: experiences and lessons learned 1993–2001, Renewable and sustainable Energy Reviews 5 (2001) 39-57
 
#Martinot E., Reiche K.: Regulatory Approaches to Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy: Case Studies from Six Developing Countries, Working Paper, World Bank, Washington DC, June 2000
 
#Owens G.: Best Practices Guide: Economic &amp; Financial Evaluation of Renewable Energy Projects, USAID 2002
 
#Reiche K., Covarrubias A., Martinot E.: Expanding Electricity Access to Remote Areas: Off-Grid Rural Electrification in Developing Countries, WorldPower (2000) 52-60
 
#World Bank Renewable Energy Toolkit: http://go.worldbank.org/Y20OGSRGH0
 
  
[[Category:Solar|Subsidies for SHS]] [[Category:Financing,_promotion_schemes_and_subsidies]]
+
[[Category:Financing_and_Funding]]
 +
[[Category:Cookstoves]]
 +
[[Category:Solar_Home_Systems_(SHS)]]

Latest revision as of 11:07, 12 February 2019

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Introduction

Normally subsidies would not be necessary in a perfect world. There is a lot of momentum to not subsidize infrastructure expansion but make this the responsibility of the private sector, and let it be the outcome of market development. However, to realize this in the presence of prevailing market failures, non conducive policy frameworks and lack of supportive concessional financing, and generally low disposable incomes for the target population, much more capacity development and institutional reforms are required than is realistically possible. It is nearly impossible to address all these shortcomings simultaneously and expect markets to take care of public service delivery. Hence, progress and achievements are greatly facilitated when subsidies can be used to provide smart incentives.


Indeed, subsidies were considered taboo by the international development community for a long time, but momentum is slowly gaining in favour of newly applying limited subsidies. Such subsidies should be designed to stimulate and initiate markets, avoid supporting the costs of operation and/or consumption in the long-run, and have a credible and transparent exit strategy. EnDev incorporated subsidies as an efficient and transparent mechanism to accelerate access to modern energy in rural and peri-urban areas.


We should not forget that the infrastructure in industrialized countries was built with a high level of subsidies and public support! Electricity has been around for more than 100 years now, but the bulk of the SSA population still does not have access and remains in the dark. This in itself could be sufficient reason to develop an emergency program to correct this and apply subsidies accordingly.

Sometimes pure logic or economic analysis fails to indicate that subsidies should be awarded after all: modern technologies are often cheaper in terms of life cycle costs / levelized energy costs compared to prevailing traditional technologies and services; data clearly shows that 4-7 month payback times exist for investing in modern lighting services. Yet, people are not investing on a large scale as could be expected. An explanation is that poor households already spend one third of their income on traditional energy like candles, kerosene and fuel wood and have no means to invest in modern technology, however urgently they are willing to do so. Subsidies really do make a difference, for households to invest in the modern technology and for the private sector to develop the infrastructure to deliver such technology. It is important to face and accept the basic trade-off: speed vs. sustainability. Access is long overdue and the focus should be on realizing this first, but in a sustainable manner and using minimum levels of subsidy.

It helps to make the subsidy support transparent; in most countries today, it is impossible to indicate the contribution of subsidies in the supply of grid electricity. Most likely these subsidies are huge, compounded throughout the supply chain: the generation capacity is subsidized, the fuel is subsidized or detaxed, the expansion of the transmission and distribution network is subsidized, connection fees and tariffs are subsidized, etc. Revenues from consumers do not cover the full costs of generation, transmission, distribution and bill collection.


In Rwanda[1]the electricity Roll-out program intends to connect 250,000 new customers over the next few years and applies a beneficiary contribution of less than 10% of the real cost of connection. It is not phrased as a subsidy, but effectively it is; imagine what could have been done with this amount of money in support of finding modern energy solutions for all rural households! In Senegal [2] several concessions have been awarded for increasing access to electricity; the average subsidy for a new connection in concession areas is about $350; alternatively, one could hand out for 5-7 free PV lanterns for the same amount.


Only a transparent cost and price structure lays the basis for continued discussion and optimization of the support given, the more so since subsidies always remain the outcome of a political process. Although this process cannot or should not be stopped, the subsidies it awards should be made transparent so that beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries alike understand where the support went.

Source: Robert vd Plas, Florian Ziegler in "EnDev Discussion Paper April 2010: Electricity Access for All - Illussions and Solutions"

[1]Lighting Africa Country Study (work in progress)

[2]Lighting Africa Country Study (work in progress)


Direct and Indirect Subsidies

► Read about what distinguishes indirect and direct subsidies here


Smart Subsidies

► Read about Smart Subsidies here


Transparency

GTZ Position (Subsidies….A Think Piece; Fuel Price Index; Access for All – Illusions and Solutions; REN21 etc.): More transparency of costs and prices is a precondition for discussion and participation. Finally, this can lead to a reduction of subsidies. This is the reason why the benefit of transparency is finally bigger for the politics, despite there may be lobbies that have an interest in intransparency.

In Germany the financial support was put in a new order with the 20th report on subsidies (2003). This report corresponds to the EU-Energiesteuerrichtlinie (RiLi 2003/96/EG), which shall achieve more transparency.<

For further information please refer to: GSI/UNEP, April 2010: Gaining Traction: The importance of transparency in accelerating the reform of fossil-fuel subsidies


Transparency can influence reform in at least four ways (Hale, 2008):

1. by institutionalizing public discourse: the act of disclosure starts a dialogue between the discloser and interested parties;

2. by compelling actors to tell the truth, making it difficult for discourse to be manipulated by one “loud,” deceitful actor;

3. by cutting through the flood of information and often contradictory claims to focus attention on facts;

and

4. by promoting self-reflection within the organization or government, compelling actors to comply with their own standards and norms.


In considering the extent to which improving transparency could assist reform, the key consideration appears to be one of ensuring its relevance. For transparency to be useful, information users and providers must desire disclosure of the information and see how such transparency can help meet their objectives. Improved information about fossil-fuel subsidies, in particular, can help governments meet their reform objectives. At the simplest level, information about the subsidy and its effects facilitates an assessment of its costs and benefits and, therefore, of the implications of reform. Making this information publicly available increases awareness of the effects of existing policies and allows public input to decision-making (Wolfe and Helmer, 2007). Many governments understand the economic, social and environmental problems created by subsidies, but are under political pressure to maintain them. Transparency can expose those winners and losers created by subsidies and therefore help to broaden support for reform (Victor, 2009).... Read more: http://www.globalsubsidies.org/files/assets/transparency_ffs.pdf

Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) - "The Effects of Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Reform: A review of modelling and empirical studies"

The Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) releases the publication of Jennifer Ellis’ paper “The Effects of Fossil-Fuel Subsidy Reform: A review of modelling and empirical studies.” This is the second paper to be published in the series Untold Billions: Fossil-fuel subsidies, their impacts and the path to reform. Subsidies are powerful instruments and when granted to fossil fuels, which are at the heart of all modern economies, subsidies have impacts throughout the economy, society and environment. Understanding the complex trade-offs between the different impacts of subsidy reform is a challenge for any government considering phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies. In this report, Jennifer Ellis provides a detailed literature review, focusing on the six modeling studies in the last 20 years that have attempted to analyze global impacts of subsidies for all fuels. The studies mostly considered effects on greenhouse gas emissions and gross domestic product, but very little of the work has considered other environmental impacts or social impacts. The paper highlights a number of areas where further research should be undertaken but concludes that there is already enough evidence to demonstrate the significant environmental and economic benefits of phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies, and recommends that policy-makers do not delay in beginning the reform process.

Download at: http://www.globalsubsidies.org/en/research/economic-social-and-environmental-effects


EARTH TRACK: EIA Energy Subsidy Estimates: A Review of Assumptions and Omissions

This Review provides a detailed look at gaps in federal tracking of energy subsidies in the United States. In addition to evaluating the research approach used by the US Energy Information Administration (EIA), the Review assesses how key assumptions and omissions in EIA's work resulted in a substantial undercounting of federal energy subsidies and an inaccurate portrayal of subsidy distribution across fuels. EIA estimates are also placed in the context of other assessments of domestic energy subsidies conducted over the past thirty years.

Read more: EIA Energy Subsidy Estimates: A Review of Assumptions and Omissions

IMF Note - Petroleum Product Subsidies: Costly, Inequitable, and Rising Petroleum product subsidies have again started to rise with the rebound in international prices. This note reviews recent developments in subsidy levels and argues that it is necessary to reform the policy framework for setting petroleum product prices in order to reduce the fiscal burden of these subsidies and to address climate change. In 2003, global consumer subsidies for petroleum products totaled nearly $60 billion. Read more: Petroleum Product Subsidies: Costly, Inequitable, and Rising


Subsidies for Solar Home System Promotion

So far all SHS programmes have relied on subsidies of one sort or another. In doing so it is often argued that market imperfections (e.g. lack of private financial institutions in rural areas, lacking information on available SHS options) justify the subsidisation of SHS or related activities. The challenging task is then how to target and allocate those corrective subsidies. This is a difficult question because what is deemed a market imperfection may well be economic barriers or transaction costs correctly priced by the market. For instance, is it a market imperfection that small amounts of money are more costly to lend than large amounts, or that lending against a steady stream of income is less risky than a loan given to a household with irregular or no income? Probably not. One could still make a case for special support measures that redress social or economic imbalances, but the case would rest on other arguments than that of imperfect or distorted markets.

Hence, the core of the discussion on subsidies boils down to the question whether SHS serve economic development or other public policy objectives. If this question is answered in the affirmative, the alleged violations of free market principles often criticised by opponents of subsidisation appear in a different light. However, the claim of contributing to the achievement of general welfare objectives has important impacts on the design of projects: SHS projects should be designed as but one component of a larger programme aiming at a variety of development objectives like power sector reform, rural electrification, and rural development.

There are direct and indirect subsidies to be found in all projects supported governmentally and internationally, and at all levels. Subsidies are quite often undisclosed, and therefore not transparent enough to be clearly recognised as such by those who would benefit, and those who have the political authority to decide in favour. This leads to SHS financing programmes that are not able to fulfil the standards of finance sector conformity and long-term sustainability. In the partly controversial discussion going on about subsidies, the view that SHS can be propagated with the help of subsidies, as long as they are transparent, serve public interest and do not distort the market, seems to be gaining ground.

Possible direct subsidies for solar systems:

  • Direct price subsidies of systems that meet minimum specs and or providers who guarantee local hubs for replacements and repair.
  • Direct subsidies to compensate quality investments, warranty and recycling
  • Tax reductions
  • Support to MFI for consumer credits
  • Import of Containers and commissioning to local retailers(thus implicitly subsidizing risk premium, import unit prices and pre-financing costs).
  • Provide Coupons to qualified technicians against, which they can buy qualified systems.

Possible indirect subsidies:

  • Teaser & Road Shows
  • Skills development for technicians, retailers
  • Support local assembly through technology transfer measures


Source: GTZ: FINANCING OF SOLAR HOME SYSTEMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, THE ROLE OF FINANCING IN THE DISSEMINATION PROCESS, Volume I: Main Report, Updated edition 2001, Eschborn, March 2001.


Approaches

A variety of approaches and strategies of direct and indirect subsidies for SHS are used at different levels:

1. Buy down grant: direct (sub-)subsidy for the primary system, reaches the end-user mostly indirectly through the dealer or a microfinance institution (MFI). In case of a service based approach, buy down grant and start-up subsidy are mixed (see below).

2. Start-up subsidy: a start-up financing for the set-up of a new company, launching new products and new services or the establishment of a rural sales and / or service system in new regions.

3. Refinancing: granting of long-term reduced interest loans for the initial investment (service model) or financing of SHS (sales model).

4. Tax and customs reduction or exemption for SHS components, installation and service.

5. Formation and training for the start-up of a new company, launching new products and services or the establishment of a rural sales and / or service system in new regions.

6. Development and dissemination of standards and quality labels and contemporaneous support of actors (companies, MFIs, NGOs, CBOs) in the introduction and application of standards and labels.

7. In case of service-oriented models, permanent cross-subsidisation of decentralised energy services with revenues from the central electricity sale or taxes.

In reality, various strategies are often combined.

Source: Study done by SiNERGi for EnDev


SHS Dissemination and Subsidies within different Projects

Sales Models Subsidies
Type Country and Project Examples 1. Buy down grant 2. Start up subsidy 3. Refi-nancing 4. Tax/ Customs Exemption 5. Formation/ Training 6. Standards, Quality Label 7. Cross-subsidisation
1. Cash sales or
dealer credit
EnDev Nicaragua X X
EnDev Uganda X X X
GTZ Tansania X X X X
2. ‚One hand model
Credit and service from one source
EnDev Bangladesh I X X X X X
EnDev Bangladesh II X X X X X
3. ‚Two hand model
Credit and service separated
EnDev Honduras X X X
Sri Lanka RERED X X X X X
Fee for Service Models Subsidies
Type Country and Project Examples 1. Buy down grant 2. Start up subsidy 3. Refi-nancing 4.Tax/ Customs
Exemption
5. Formation/ Training 6. Standards, Quality Label 7. Cross-
subsidisation
1. Concession based regulated service EVU or RESCO EnDev Senegal X X X
GTZ Pakistan X X X X X
2. Non regulated
service through RESCOs
Sunlabob Laos X X ? X ?
3. Service through local NGO or cooperative Solarstiftung Äthiopien X X ?
4. Management contract with RESCO Sunlabob Laos X ? X ?


As the tables show the sales models prevail; subsidy rates range between 0% and 60 %. The target group and the availability of affordable loans for the target group are obviously critical drivers, besides the size of the system.
Fee for service models have higher subsidy rates (70-100%). This may be caused by:

1. aiming for a high market penetration (Poor and dispersed households are more involved, than in the sales models)
2. establishing and substituting a aftersale service.


Besides direct subsidies (buy down grant, start up subsidies), a lot of projects use indirect subsidies, too:

• All projects foster training and qualification (except Bangladesh, because this was already done by the World bank- project
• In most of the project-countries SHS are free of purchase tax and tolls
• Some projects offer low interest refunding for local MFIs and RESCOs. To lower the transaction costs, the smaller projects in Tanzania and Honduras offer allowances to setup capital for the further dissemination of SHS instead of credits.
• Quality standards and certifications are only used within the big programmes of the world bank. Their implementation is obviously too expensive for smaller, short-term projects. But it may be possible that the projects in Senegal, Tanzania and Uganda will take over this approach in the long run.

Source: SiNERGi study


Summary SHS Subsidies

The various existing subsidy approaches are independent of the diffusion models; this can be divided in sales oriented or service oriented models

Sales-oriented models:
The SHS will end up getting into the hands of the user; he will also assume the responsibility for maintenance and operation.

1. Cash payment: immediate payment or short-term (more expensive) credit, mostly for not more than 6 months and 50% of the cost Due to the high cost of SHS and often inadequate after-sale service of this model rarely reaches poor communities in remote areas.

2. One-hand model: Hire-purchase leasing. The SHS is directly in the property of the purchaser, who will therefore normally take full responsibility for operation and maintenance. The credit institution and installer are the same institution, the SHS serves as collateral. The loan is repaid in monthly installments over 2-3 years.

3. Two-hand model: Hire-purchase leasing. The difference with the one-hand-model is that the credit institution and installer are different companies, this gives greater flexibility of the provider, but twice the cost structure of service).
4. Leasing systems: the user rents the SHS only for a certain period, and he is also responsible for maintenance and operation, but this is rarely used in practice.


In the next table an overview of distribution costs, retail prices and subsidy shares are given.
Table: Cost and subsidy comparison

Country Model Dissemination cost in € per SHS Cost for the user in € Percentage of the direct subsidy1
EnDev Nicaragua Cash 600 (75-85 Wp) 220-280 54-63%
EnDev Honduras Two hand 576 (54 Wp) 231-301 60%
EnDev Bangladesh One hand 341 (50 Wp) 290 15%
EnDev Bangladesh II One hand 142-149 (21 Wp) 98-115 19-34%
EnDev Uganda Cash 420 (50 Wp) 420 0%2
EnDev Senegal Concesion 498 (50 Wp) 30 Anschluss,

6 pro Monat

70%
GTZ Tansania Cash 200 (14 Wp) 200 0%
Roshan Pakistan Concesion  ?? (40 Wp) 4,10 Anschluss, 1,76 pro Monat 100%
Solar donation Ethiopia Service NGO 200 (10 Wp) Anschluss frei, 0,17 pro Monat 100%
Sunlabob Laos Service RESCO  ?? (20 Wp)  ?? Anschluss, 2,5 pro Monat 0%3
Sri Lanka RERED Two hand 372-437 (?30? Wp) 310-375 14-17%

1: Direct cost of the system and the installation without O&M.
2: For private costumer, for social institutions will be up to 85% of the cost subsidized.
3: But preferential refinance credits


For an evaluation of this economical data, more information about the quality and sustainability of the SHS as well as O&M should be collected. In addition to the question, how far could the target group of rural poor population in the various examples be achieved?


Nevertheless, some preliminary conclusions can be done:
• Credit systems, whether one-or two-hand models, for their success need a small increase in the amount of subsidy.
• Fee for service systems, in comparison to sales systems, need to be stronger subsidised.


Source: SiNERGi study


Subsidies for Improved Cookstoves

► Read more here


Further Information

  1. New study on energy access subsidies conducted by EnDev and SV PPI available. Energy Subsidies: Why, When and How?
  2. Energypedia-article about Financing Models for Solar Home Systems
  3. Mirco Gaul's (SiNERGi) study on Subsidy schemes for the dissemination of improved stovesgives a brief overview of the current state of approaches and strategies for the promotion of improved stoves as implemented by EnDev projects in Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia and Mali
  4. paper by Kenneth P. Thomas: Assessing Sustainable Development Impacts of Investment Incentives: A Checklist, IISD, 2009
  5. ASTAE: Best Practices for Photovoltaic Household Electrification Programs, World Bank, Washington DC, 1996
  6. Barnes D. F.: Meeting the Challenge of Rural Electrification in Developing Nations: The Experience of Successful Programs, Word Bank, ESMAP, March 2005
  7. ESMAP: Best Practice Manual: Promoting Decentralized Electrification Investment, October 2001
  8. Gunaratne L.: Rural Energy Services - Best Practices, USAID / SARI Energy Program, May 2002
  9. Hankins M., Banks D.: Solar Photovoltaics in Africa, Experiences with Financing and Delivery Models, UNDP-GEF M&E Report Series No 2, New York, May 2004
  10. IEA PVPS: Summary of Models for the Implementation of Solar Home Systems in Developing Countries, Part 1 and 2, Report IEA PVPS T9-02:2003
  11. IEA PVPS: Financing Mechanisms for Solar Home Systems in Developing Countries, Report IEA PVPS T9-01:2002
  12. IEA PVPS: 16 Case Studies on the Deployment of Photovoltaic Technologies in Developing Countries, Report IEA PVPS T9-07:2003
  13. International Resources Group: Evaluating the Potential for Scale-Up of Off-Grid Renewable Power, World Bank, Washington DC, July 2003
  14. ISES: Rural Energy Suply models – RESuM, 2001, http://resum.ises.org/
  15. Komives K., Foster V. et al.: Water, Electricity, and the Poor: Who Benefits from Utility Subsidies?, World Bank, Washington DC, 2005
  16. Lindlein P., Mostert W.: Financing Instruments for Renewable Energy, Part of World Bank’s ”Road Map for Scaling up Access to Modern Energy Services and Clean Energy”, World Bank, Washington DC, 2005
  17. Martinot E. et al: World Bank/GEF solar home system projects: experiences and lessons learned 1993–2001, Renewable and sustainable Energy Reviews 5 (2001) 39-57
  18. Martinot E., Reiche K.: Regulatory Approaches to Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy: Case Studies from Six Developing Countries, Working Paper, World Bank, Washington DC, June 2000
  19. Owens G.: Best Practices Guide: Economic & Financial Evaluation of Renewable Energy Projects, USAID 2002
  20. Reiche K., Covarrubias A., Martinot E.: Expanding Electricity Access to Remote Areas: Off-Grid Rural Electrification in Developing Countries, WorldPower (2000) 52-60
  21. World Bank Renewable Energy Toolkit: http://go.worldbank.org/Y20OGSRGH0
  22. Examples of Legal Texts and Regulations to Lift Import Duties for PV Products
  23. National Approaches to Electrification - Review of Options


References