Difference between revisions of "Bidding Strategies in Brazilian Electricity Auctions"
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| − | {{ | + | {{CSP Database |
| − | | | + | |CSP title=Bidding Strategies in Brazilian Electricity Auctions |
| − | | | + | |CSP Author=Erick M. Azevedo and Paulo B.Correia |
| − | | | + | |CSP Year=2006 |
| − | | | + | |CSP Country=Brazil |
| − | | | + | |CSP Technology= |
| − | | | + | |CSP Type of Document=Research and development |
| − | | | + | |CSP Language=English |
| − | | | + | |CSP Language AR= |
| − | | | + | |CSP Language URL ar= |
| − | | | + | |CSP Language EN= |
| − | | | + | |CSP Language URL en=https://www.dropbox.com/s/9fuhao3g4exfjd8/2006_Azevedo%20et%20al_Bidding%20strategies%20in%20Brazilian%20electricity%20auctions.pdf |
| − | + | |CSP Language FR= | |
| + | |CSP Language URL fr= | ||
| + | |CSP Language DE= | ||
| + | |CSP Language URL de= | ||
| + | |CSP Language PR= | ||
| + | |CSP Language URL pr= | ||
| + | |CSP Language RU= | ||
| + | |CSP Language URL ru= | ||
| + | |CSP Language SP= | ||
| + | |CSP Language URL sp= | ||
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| + | |CSP Abstract=Double bilateral contract auctions for electric energy purchase and sale occur in Brazil. These auctions present incomplete information and possess some subjectivity in relation to the future scenario of the Brazilian electric system, inserted in the agent’s bids. In this work, a model using Bayes’ rule and the game theory is proposed to aid the agent in its bid definition. | ||
| + | Through the existing relations between the Conditionalprobabilities of Bayes’ Rule, the model transforms beliefs into information.In this way, the absence of information is supplied and the problem is transformed into a game with complete information. The present study has no worries in terms of transmission constraints, since they are not usually considered in the bilateral contract auctions in Brazil. At the end, Nash equilibrium (NE) can be found through the expected payoff matrix of each agent. | ||
}} | }} | ||
Latest revision as of 14:20, 20 July 2016
Bidding Strategies in Brazilian Electricity Auctions
| Title | Bidding Strategies in Brazilian Electricity Auctions |
| Author | Erick M. Azevedo and Paulo B.Correia |
| Year | 2006 |
| Country | Brazil |
| Type of Technology | |
| Type of Document | Research and development |
| File Download | |
| Language(s) | English |
| Abstract | Double bilateral contract auctions for electric energy purchase and sale occur in Brazil. These auctions present incomplete information and possess some subjectivity in relation to the future scenario of the Brazilian electric system, inserted in the agent’s bids. In this work, a model using Bayes’ rule and the game theory is proposed to aid the agent in its bid definition.
Through the existing relations between the Conditionalprobabilities of Bayes’ Rule, the model transforms beliefs into information.In this way, the absence of information is supplied and the problem is transformed into a game with complete information. The present study has no worries in terms of transmission constraints, since they are not usually considered in the bilateral contract auctions in Brazil. At the end, Nash equilibrium (NE) can be found through the expected payoff matrix of each agent. |
